

Women in Editorial Boards:
An Investigation of Female Representation in Top Economic Journals*

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Abstract

We study the evolution of female representation in editorial roles for 15 top journals in economics from 1960 to 2019. We first document that the share of women in editorial roles has steadily increased over the past six decades. Second, we investigate whether this increase is due to an expansion of the pool of qualified female economists, or due to a different selection probability by gender. We find evidence for both using a large database on academic records of more than 37,000 economists. Third, to understand whether there are gender gaps in the probability of being offered and/or of accepting editorial positions, we administer a large-scale survey among most prominent scholars in economics. We only find evidence for the offering channel. Finally, we study the implications of female editors on topic diversity, the quality of accepted papers, and potential trickle down effects on female authors' publishing prospects.

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1 Introduction

Despite considerable progress in recent decades, women continue to be underrepresented in the field of economics (Lundberg and Stearns, 2019). As documented for more than 200 top research institutions in economics, only 25% of senior economists and 37% of junior economists are female (Auriol et al., 2022). Prior evidence suggests that women may face hurdles in their academic careers, such as disadvantages in promotions (Ginther and Kahn, 2021), insufficient recognition of co-authorship (Sarsons, 2017; Sarsons et al., 2021), a hostile climate (Wu, 2020), and higher standards when publishing (Card et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022).

Journal editors play a key role in determining which type of research gets published. Given the strong evidence that female and male researchers have different preferences for research topics (evidence exists at the undergraduate level, Beneito et al. 2021; PhD level, Fortin et al. 2021; as well as at the advanced research level, Dolado et al. 2012; Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham 2017; Ayarza and Iriberry 2024), an adequate representation of women on editorial boards may be crucial to ensure the publication of topics particularly relevant to female economists.

In this paper, we investigate whether the process leading to the appointment of journal editors in economics has been gender neutral in the past 60 years, and if not, its implications for the profession. We distinguish between two important editorial roles that journals publish on their front pages: editors (including co-editors) and associate editors. Editors select referees and ultimately decide which papers are being published, therefore shaping the frontier of knowledge in the economic science. Associate editors commit to providing a high number of reviews per year, thereby serving as the primary source of referee reports. In light of the importance of editorial tasks, studying whether equally qualified male and female scholars have had the same likelihood of holding these positions is pressing, both from an efficiency and fairness point of view.

Despite the relevance of this question, scientific research has made little progress beyond *measuring* the share of women in editorial boards. In various fields, such as psychology, neuroscience, medicine, political science and mathematics, studies have documented that the presence of women in editorial positions is far from parity (Palser et al., 2022; Amrein et al., 2011; Stegmaier et al., 2011; Topaz and Sen, 2016), which is probably not too surprising given that women are strongly under-represented in the pool of active researchers in many of these fields (Ceci and Williams, 2011; Commission, 2021). For a large sample of economics journals, Baccini and Re (2024) also document similar gender patterns on editorial boards, next to exploring geographical and institutional affiliation. Although measuring female representation in editorial roles is an important starting point, this paper takes a significant step forward

by investigating whether female and male economists with similar academic profiles and qualifications have had the same probability of getting appointed to editorial roles.

To answer this question, we hand-collected information on editorial positions for 15 of the most prestigious economic journals and combine it with a large data set on dynamically evolving academic records of active economists, created by [Card et al. \(2022\)](#). We cover more than 37,000 economists from the year of their first publication until 11 years after their last publication (or their death) and measure on a yearly basis: the number of publications in each of 36 high-impact journals (see Appendix Table [A1](#) for the complete list of journals), as well as the number of cites accumulated by publications in the top-5 journals (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *American Economic Review*, *Review of Economic Studies* and *Econometrica*). For all active economists in year t , we pose the question: conditional on academic records (cumulative publications in each journal, cites for top-5 publications, and years since first publication as a proxy for academic age), does gender play any role for getting appointed to an editorial role in the most prestigious economic journals?

We start by analyzing the overall role of gender in editorial appointments for all 15 journals at both editor and associate editor level, spanning the years 1960 to 2019. Subsequently, we conduct heterogeneity analyses by journal tier, editorial role, and across different time windows. Specifically, we distinguish between the top-5 journals and three additional important general interest journals (*Economic Journal*, *Review of Economics and Statistics* and *Journal of the European Economic Association*), to which we refer to as the *top-8 general-interest journals*, and seven major top-field journals (*Journal of Finance*, *Journal of Monetary Economics*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Journal of Econometrics*, *Journal of Development Economics*, *Journal of Public Economics* and *Journal of Labour Economics*).¹ From now on we will use abbreviations (see Appendix Table [A2](#)) to refer to these journals.

Consistent with prior evidence from different disciplines, our raw data indicate that, despite an increasing female presence on editorial boards, women only hold a minority of editorial positions in economic journals. However, we do not find any evidence that women had a lower likelihood of being selected into editorial positions conditional on their academic performance. In fact, we find that women had a *higher* likelihood of being selected for editorial roles, a phenomenon which we will refer to as *conditional over-selection*.² Our heterogeneity analysis shows that over-selection is concentrated in the top-8 general-interest

¹We exclude the AEJ journals, as well as *Theoretical Economics* and *Quantitative Economics* as they were founded very recently (2009, 2006 and 2010, respectively).

²Note that over-selection based on academic record may not necessarily imply favoritism, if, for example, there are greater publishing hurdles for female authors. We will provide a careful interpretation of the results in section [4.5](#).

journals and in associate editor positions beginning in the 1980s. Women were almost twice as likely to be appointed associate editor in general-interest journals in the 1980s and 1990s compared to their male colleagues, and about 1.4 times as likely in 2000–2019. For editor positions in the same journal tier, we observe over-selection only in the last decade. The estimates reveal that women were 1.7 times as likely to be appointed, compared to men. However, for editor roles, this effect becomes insignificant once we control for prior associate editor experience, which is an important predictor of becoming an editor. In contrast to the substantial over-selection at top general-interest journals, top-field journals show no evidence of gender differences in selection conditional on academic record.

To validate our main findings, we conduct additional robustness exercises on the over-selection of female authors into associate editor roles at top-8 general-interest journals. First, note that the observed gender differences in selection are a priori compatible with general-interest journals striving to diversify their field expertise. To assess whether general interest journals are aiming at field diversity, we test whether gender differences in selection persist, even when controlling for authors’ predicted selection probability based on their previous publication titles (as a proxy for their field). We find that field diversity does play a role but is not the main reason behind the over-selection of women into editorial positions at top-8 journals. Second, consistent with previous findings, connections to editors via co-authorship are important determinants for selection into editorial roles (see [Card et al. 2022](#) for becoming Fellow of the Econometric Society, and [Colussi 2018](#), [Ductor and Visser 2022](#) and [Carrell et al. 2024](#) for publishing). However, our results remain robust to controlling for network effects. Finally, for a large share of authors publishing in the last two decades, we gathered additional data on authors’ affiliations and expanded our database of academic records to include journals outside the initial set of 36 journals. Again, the over-selection of women into associate editor positions at top-general interest journals prevails when controlling for affiliations and considering publications in a wider set of journals.

What are the possible interpretations of the observed over-selection of women? One explanation is that journals deliberately appoint more women to achieve more gender-balanced editorial boards, for example, due to a preference for diversity. This motive might be particularly strong for general-interest journals as they are more visible than field journals and may therefore have stronger incentives to signal diversity. General-interest journals might also have greater scope to adapt their editorial appointments to diversity concerns, as they are less constrained by field-specific expertise. However, there are at least three main alternative explanations. First, given the evidence that female researchers face certain barriers in the publishing process ([Card et al., 2020](#); [Hengel, 2022](#)), publication and citation records might under-estimate the quality of female scholars. If journals take this into account when inviting

scholars to take up editorial positions, this could explain the over-selection of women (see [Bohren et al. 2019](#) for a theoretical argument). Second, female scholars might outperform men in unobserved personal characteristics, such as diligence, communication, or mediation skills, that are advantageous in editorial work; or alternatively, journal directors might *expect* female scholars to outperform men. Third, women may be more likely to accept offered positions, or, alternatively, journals may also be more likely to offer positions to women if they expect them to be more likely to accept. Importantly, all three alternative explanations – biased observable achievements, actual or perceived differences in unobserved traits, or journals’ beliefs about differences in acceptance rates – are consistent with over-selection, and do not necessarily imply preferential treatment of women in the allocation of editorial positions.

To test for the third mechanism, we conducted an online survey administered to a large sample of potential candidates for editorial positions. This allows us to assess whether the higher (conditional) presence of women in editorial positions is the result of a larger likelihood of being *offered* an editorial position, or of a higher propensity to *accept* a given offer. Based on more than 1,000 responses, our survey data points to the offering channel as the primary driver: conditional on demographic characteristics, female economists were more likely to receive offers, while their acceptance rates did not significantly differ from those of men.

Finally, given the rise in female representation on editorial boards, an immediate question follows: What are the implications of this shift for journals, submitting authors and editors themselves? Using the sample of published papers for which we observe the name of the editor-in-charge, we examine three potential consequences of having female editors: diversity in topics and sub-fields, quality of publications and trickle-down effects on female authors. We are aware, however, that establishing causality is not possible due to non-random assignment of papers to editors and non-random selection of editors. First, we demonstrate that the topics of accepted papers, as indicated by the detailed JEL code classification and the words used in abstracts, differ considerably by the gender of the editor-in-charge. We complement this analysis by showing that having female scholars entering editorial boards is associated with an increase in topic diversity within journals. Second, using ex-post accumulated citations as a proxy for quality, we show that conditional on factors influencing the citation count of a paper (e.g. 2-digit JEL codes), female editors perform just as well as their male colleagues in maximizing the citation count of their journal. Third, female editors are not more likely to publish papers by female authors, once we control for paper characteristics such as JEL codes. As such, having more female editors can help women get published, even though merely through the field in which they are active. Finally, we also test for the potential consequences on research productivity for those authors who hold editorial positions. Performing an event

study, we find that, while serving editorial positions, research productivity, measured by the number of publications, goes down by 0.7 papers over the first 5 years. Even though we do not find differential effects by gender, the observed over-selection of women implies higher productivity losses for female scholars in the short run.

In sum, we find that top general interest journals can attain higher topic diversity by over-selecting women into editorial positions while maintaining quality and scientific impact. The only potential drawback of this shift falls back on female scholars accepting those positions: they experience a reduction in research productivity.

Our paper contributes to a small but growing literature investigating the role of gender in various domains in economics: in the publication process (Card et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022); in conference acceptance rates (Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017; Hospido and Sanz, 2021); in getting authorship in research teams (Ross et al., 2022); in the recognition of co-authored work (Sarsons, 2017; Sarsons et al., 2021); in job applications and promotions (Hospido et al., 2022; Eberhardt et al., 2023; Baltrunaite et al., 2025); in teaching evaluations (Boring, 2017; Mengel et al., 2019; Funk et al., 2024); in the general climate in the profession (Wu, 2020; Dupas et al., 2026); in visibility (Venus, 2025); in citation patterns (Koffi, 2021, 2025); and in peer recognition (Card et al., 2022, 2023).

However, the empirical evidence on gender disparities in editorial boards of academic journals is so far very limited. As mentioned before, there are a handful of studies mostly from disciplines outside economics, which measure the share of women in editorial boards. Lacking detailed data on research performance, these studies are confined to comparing female representation in editorial boards to the share of women in a reference population. Addis and Villa (2003) is one exception in the field of economics. Their paper, however, is confined to Italian journals and merely measures the female share among editorial board members, comparing it with the proportion of women among faculty members in Italy. Another approach, followed by Johannesen and Muchardt (2026), is to focus only on already appointed editors and to compare the academic achievements between men and women at the time of this career step. This approach hinges on the assumption that both successful (observed) and not successful (unobserved) male and female scholars exhibit the same distribution of achievements. In comparison, we observe academic records for a large pool of potential candidates (the risk set). In addition, we take a historic perspective going back to the 1960s, condition on a broader range of academic achievements, differentiate by different editorial roles and examine the potential implications of the rise of women on editorial boards.

The subsequent sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 describes all our data sources. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics on the different data sets and documents the evolution of the unconditional female representation among editorial roles

over time. Section 4 presents estimates of the conditional gender gap in selection, followed by a heterogeneity and robustness analysis, and concludes with the discussion of the underlying mechanism. Section 5 tests for the implications of having female scholars in editorial roles. Finally, section 6 concludes.

2 Data

We combine data on editorial positions, which we hand-collected from the front pages of the most relevant journals in economics (15 journals in total), with data on a large sample of actively publishing economists, hereafter referred to as the *publication data set* (Card et al., 2022). We complement these data sets that rely on publicly available data with a survey, which we designed and administered to a sample of prominent economists. The goal of the survey is to shed light on whether potential gender differences in selection into editorial positions are coming from the journal’s demand side (gender differences in offer rates) or the authors’ supply side (gender differences in the propensity to accept a given offer).

2.1 Editorial Positions

For each of the 15 journals we consider, we manually collected the names of all scholars holding editorial positions from the front matter pages of each issue. This allows us to keep track of when they were appointed and for how long they kept the position. The journals we consider are the top-5 plus three general-interest journals (QJE, JPE, AER, REStud, ECMA, EJ, REStat and JEEA), as well as seven top-field journals (JDE, JME, JF, JEc, JOLE, JET and JPubE). The top-field journals were selected such that, on the one hand, a variety of fields and, on the other hand, both fields with a stronger male and female representation are included. We cover the years from the start of each journal up to 2019, the last year in our publication data set.

Since titles of editorial roles differ across journals and years, we classify editorial positions according to their main tasks. We distinguish between two types of roles. First, editors (including co-editors) select referees and make final decisions upon the acceptance of a paper. Second, associate editors commit to writing a large number of referee reports each year. General-interest journals typically follow this structure. Some of the field journals in our sample have a different organizational structure and were classified according to the logic above. The exact mapping between editorial titles and roles is documented in the Appendix Table A2.

All scholars in editorial positions were then matched to the publication data set (described next). Fewer than 5% of authors holding editorial positions at top-8 and less than 3% of those holding positions at top-field journals could not be matched to authors in the publication

data set.³

2.2 Publication Data Set

[Card et al. \(2022\)](#) contains publication and citation data for over 40,000 economists over time. This allows us to construct dynamically evolving academic records for all economists in our sample. For each author and year, we observe the number of publications in each of 36 journals (see Appendix Table A1 for the complete list of journals) and the number of citations of papers in each of the top-5 journals. This data set also includes the information on the gender of all authors.⁴ Authors are included starting from the year of their first publication, our proxy for their academic age, up to 11 years after their last publication or upon their death.⁵ It is important to note that, compared to the universe of scholars in economics, this data set includes authors who are relatively prominent. However, given that our main outcome variable is holding editorial roles in the most important economic journals, it is the right sample to look at.

The underlying paper-level data from which the author-level publication records were aggregated, spans the years from 1960 to 2019 and contains the titles of publications, as well as the full set of authors of each publication (but not institutional affiliations).⁶ On the one hand, we use the publication titles to extract information on research fields and topics since alternative indicators such as JEL codes or keywords are not available dating further back in time. As explained in more detail in section 4.4, we predict authors' selection probability based on the text of their publication titles and use this as a control variable to assess the role of journals' field preferences in the selection of editors. On the other hand, we use this data set to create measures of connections via co-authors to control for network effects as a robustness check. For each journal, we construct a variable indicating whether the author has, up to a given year, co-authored a paper with a current editor or associate editor of that journal. This variable increases by 1 in the year in which a (previous or current) co-author becomes editor or associate editor for a given journal, or in which the economist co-authors for the first time with a current editor or associate editor, and decreases by 1 as soon as the

³These percentages include two cases: 1) names that are not at all contained in the publication data set and 2) names that could not be matched for all the years in which they were holding editorial positions.

⁴The full process of identifying authors' gender is described in detail in the Online Appendix of [Card et al. \(2020\)](#) and a validation of this method is provided in Online Appendix A1 in [Card et al. \(2022\)](#).

⁵The large majority of authors, slightly over 90%, hold editorial roles while they are actively publishing. However, a still relevant fraction holds those positions after their last publication in the set of 36 journals. We chose the threshold of +11 years, such that we only leave out 1% of the editorial positions. Results are robust when considering different thresholds. Additional analysis (available upon request) confirms that the results remain robust when reducing the threshold to include authors up to five years after their last publication or when excluding all authors who were not actively publishing in that year.

⁶Note that this data set neither contains abstracts nor JEL codes, as these only became widely used from the 1990s onward.

co-author leaves the editorial position.⁷

Finally, we obtained institutional affiliations and publications of an extended list of journals from OpenAlex, to test if our results are robust to including authors' affiliation and publications in other journals. To keep data collection efforts manageable, we restricted the sample to those authors in the publication data set who published at least once in the time window from 2000-2019. Based on information in the paper-level data, we first collected the OpenAlex IDs of all authors, and then obtained the full publication history associated with the ID, along with the affiliation the author specified on the paper. After cleaning the raw affiliation data, we extracted the most frequent main affiliation for each year, considering only long-term main affiliations. Detailed information on the cleaning process of the raw data and the results of a validation exercise are provided in Online Appendix B. For 72% of the approximately 25,000 authors who published at least once in the years 2000-2019, we were able to obtain reliable affiliation information. Second, to address concerns that the set of journals contained in Card et al. (2022) is not sufficiently broad enough, we expanded it by 15 additional journals based on the publication records obtained from OpenAlex: the wider set of journals include six additional journals in macro and finance (*Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, *Journal of Financial Economics*, *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, *Review of Financial Studies*, *Review of Economic Dynamics*, *Journal of Economic Growth*), three journals in urban and environmental economics (*Journal of Urban Economics*, *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*), four journals in labor, education and personnel economics (*Labour Economics*, *The Journal of Human Resources*, *Economics of Education Review*, *Management Science*) and two journals in experimental economics (*Experimental Economics*, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*).

2.3 Survey to Prominent Economists

We conducted a large-scale survey administered to prominent economists who had been actively publishing in the last 20 years. The survey design was approved by the Ethics Committee of Università della Svizzera italiana. The authors received an invitation by email, which contained a link to the survey.

The survey was carried out in two waves. For the first wave, conducted during October and November 2023, we selected economists from the publication data set who had published at least five times between 2000 and 2019 in any of the 36 journals in our data set (listed in Appendix Table A1) and at least once in any of the top-8 or top-field journals for which

⁷Therefore, we measure the extensive margin i.e. the number of journals to which an author is connected through co-authoring with a member of the editorial board, but not the intensive margin, i.e. the number of co-authors through whom an author is connected to a particular journal.

we collected editorial positions. In total 4,520 economists were invited to complete the anonymous questionnaire online, to which we will refer to as survey authors.⁸ To incentivize participation, we offered the opportunity to participate in a lottery with three prizes of 1,000 CHF each. We randomized survey authors across different sub-samples to induce variation in response rates: each day, from Monday to Friday, 20% of the sample received the survey invitation. Survey authors who did not fill it in received a first reminder one week after their first email invitation. In week three, the second reminder was sent only to half of the sub-sample of those who did not yet fill in the survey. Finally, in week four a last reminder was sent to all survey authors who did not fill in the survey yet reminding them that the survey will close within a week. The randomization (over week days and the second reminder) was designed in order to use it as an instrument for controlling for selection into answering the survey. Eventually, the survey closed four weeks after the first email invitation.

The second wave was conducted between December 2023 to January 2024, following the same procedure and randomization as in the first wave. This time, we included those economists with three or four publications between 2000 and 2019 in any of the 36 journals in our data set and at least one in any of the top-8 or top-field journals. The sample consisted of 2,736 economists and the lottery was one prize of 1,000 CHF.⁹

In the survey, we asked survey authors whether they received an offer to serve as editor or associate editor at any top-8, top-field or other journals and whether they accepted it. Furthermore, authors were requested to specify their motivations to accept or reject those offers (in case they had an offer) or their expected motivations (in case they did not have an offer), as well as their experiences. Finally, survey authors were also requested to state their gender (men, women, prefer not to say), location (USA, Europe, other), field of research (macro/finance, theory/econometrics, applied/empirical micro and other) and when they finished their PhDs (before the 80s, 80s, 90s, 2000s and 2010s). For the complete list of questions included in the survey, see Section C in the Appendix.

3 Descriptive Statistics

3.1 Number of Economists in Editorial Positions

Figure 1 shows the number of economists in our sample who were editor or associate editor at any of the journals considered (top panel), at any top-8 (lower left panel), and at any of the field journals (lower right panel). Up to the 1930s, the number of economists serving as

⁸This number excludes those authors to whom we could not send the email because we found no available email or because the email was returned to us.

⁹Again, this number excludes those authors to whom we could not send the email because we found no available email or because the email was returned to us.

editors and associate editors remained stable and below ten. The foundation of REStud and ECMA (both in 1933) and the re-launch of REStat (in 1936) initiated a significant increase in the number of economists in editorial positions. In the late 1940s the number of editors experienced a slight decrease due to an organizational switch at REStat, while the number of associate editor positions began a steady ascent.

Starting from the 1960s, also the number of economists serving as editors began rising continuously, fueled by the introduction of several field journals. Since the 1950s, the total number of editors has consistently stayed below the number of associate editors. This is driven by the top-8 journals, all of which gradually introduced associate editors over time. In contrast, top-field journals relied predominantly on editors, with only two out of the seven journals having associate editors. Since both the count of editors and associate editors was steadily increasing since 1960, we chose this year as the starting point of our analysis.

3.2 Summary Statistics on Editors and Associate Editors

Table 1 reports summary statistics on economists for those years in which they were actively serving as editors or associate editors at least at one of the top-8 general-interest journals (top panel) and at least one of the top-field journals (bottom panel). For the sake of readability, we report publications and citations in the top-5 journals, as well as a proxy for academic age. We display the summary statistics for different periods of time, as requirements to become editor, as well as the importance of different journals may have changed.

For both panels, men in editorial roles had on average more top-5 publications (across all journals) than women. For both editors and associate editors, the gender difference is smallest at the QJE and largest at ECMA and REStud. A similar picture arises from the number of citations of top-5 publications at all journals, except for the QJE, in which female editors in the top-8 journals are cited more frequently than male editors. Finally, women in editorial roles are on average academically younger than men. The exception is given by editors and associate editors in top-field journals. Although the average male editor was more than 9 years younger than his female counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s, this pattern has since reversed, with female editors now being, on average, around 4 years younger than male editors. When comparing the summary statistics across the top and bottom panels, the main difference, as expected, is that editors and associate editors in top-field journals have on average fewer publications than the authors in editorial positions in top-8 journals.

Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix contain the publication statistics for all the 36 journals. Turning to publications outside the top-5, the gender gap is largest in theory journals, and even reversed in field journals of development, health, labor and public economics. This points to gendered specializations into fields among editorial board members. Finally, Appendix

Tables [A5](#) and [A6](#) contain descriptive statistics on affiliations and publications in the extended set of journals for editors and associate editors in top-8 and top-field journals. As expected, editors and associate editors at top-8 general-interest journals are more likely to be affiliated with top-10 U.S. institutions than their counterparts at top-field journals.

3.3 Female Share among Actively Publishing Economists, Editors and Associate Editors

Clearly, the sample of editors is a highly selected sample. Summary statistics on the pool of actively publishing economists (Appendix Table [A7](#)) show that very few economists hold editorial positions in the most relevant 15 journals in economics. By gender, the likelihood for a male economist to be editor remained relatively stable around 1.8%, while for female economists it increased from 0.6% to 0.9%. At the same time, men’s probability to serve as associate editor decreased over time, from 3.2% to 2.0% in the last two decades, whereas women’s remained constant over time at around 1.5%. Appendix Table [A8](#) shows affiliations of actively publishing economists. As expected, editors and associate editors are over-represented in US top-10 institutions compared to actively publishing economists.

The top graph in Figure [2](#) shows how the proportion of women in the pool of actively publishing economists (green line) has developed over time. While in the 60s, the share of women among active economists was around 5 percent, it steadily increased up to more than 20 percent by 2020. Did the development of women in editorial positions follow the overall increase in the share of women among active researchers? We can see two main patterns with respect to the female share among editorial roles. First, the share of women in both editor and associate editor positions (blue and red lines, respectively) started to increase steadily, and at an accelerated pace around the year 2000. Second, the female share among the associate editors has been consistently above the female share among the editors since the 1970s. The bottom left and right graphs in Figure [2](#) further split the female share of editorial positions by journal type. The two main patterns remain but with a few distinctive features. For top-general interest journals, the female share among editors shows a higher increase from 2010, reaching almost the female share among associate editors by 2019. For top-field journals, the female share for the two editorial positions have shown a similar level and increasing trend until 2000 but after 2000 the female share among associate editors shows a steeper trend compared to the editors.

How does the evolution of the share of women in editorial positions compare with the share of women in the pool of potential editors? Note that we cannot simply compare the share of female editors (blue and red lines) with the share of active researchers (green line) in Figure [2](#). Journal editors have much stronger academic records than the average economist (compare the number of publications of editors and associate editors, Tables [A3](#) and [A4](#),

with the publications of active economists, Appendix Table A7). To get a better benchmark for the economists with academic records more similar to actual editors, we plot the female share among the more prominent economists (with at least 3 top-5 publications - brown line). As documented in Card et al. (2022) and Ayarza and Iriberry (2024), the share of female economists decreases the more we restrict the journal sample to higher quality journals.

Figure 2 shows that in the 70s the share of female economists holding positions as editors or associate editors started off from the same level as the female share of economists with at least three top-5 publications. Subsequently, the proportion of women in associate editor roles exhibited a steeper increase compared to the proportion of women among highly published economists. A similar trend was observed for editors since the mid-1990s. Hence, this simple benchmark shows that women, if anything, have been over-represented in editorial positions, specifically among associate editors since the 70s and among editors since 2000.

Although suggestive, we cannot rule out that other factors such as academic age or varying impacts of the number of publications by journal across time might explain the over-representation of women in editorial positions evident in our descriptive analysis. We therefore proceed by rigorously conditioning on the researchers' academic records in the regression analysis presented in the subsequent section.

3.4 Summary Statistics on the Survey Respondents

Out of the 7,256 economists that were contacted in the survey, we received 1,121 responses of which 987 were complete (643 and 344 responses in the first and second waves, respectively), meaning that every item in the questionnaire was answered. This amounts to response rates of 14.3% and 12.6%, respectively, which are below those obtained in surveys targeted individually at a small set of scholars in economics (i.e. 40% in Card et al. 2020) but well above surveys similar to ours which target a large set of scholars in economics (2.7% in Shastry and Shurchkov 2024, 3.4% in Chopra et al. 2024).

The demographic characteristics of our survey respondents are shown in Table 2. Around 16% of our respondents identified as female and around 2/3 completed their PhDs in the 1990s and 2000s. More than half of the respondents are based in Europe and 1/3 in the US. Around 50% works in applied/empirical microeconomics, followed by theory/econometrics and macro/finance. Male respondents were on average more senior, more frequently based in Europe and less likely to work in applied micro. The share of women among respondents is very close to the share in our sample of economists considered actively-publishing in the years from 2000 to 2019 (17%, see Appendix Table A7). Assuming the first publication occurs around the year of PhD completion, the respondents and our regression sample are also comparable in terms of academic age.

4 Main Results: Gender and Selection into Editorial Roles

4.1 Methodology

In the main analysis, we focus on the role of gender in the selection of economists into editorial positions. We construct an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist is first appointed as editor or associate editor and 0 otherwise. Then we predict this indicator variable conditional on authors' gender as well as their publication record, impact as measured by the number of citations, and academic age.¹⁰ This yields an estimate of the conditional gender gap in selection i.e. whether women are, conditional on their academic records, equally likely to be selected into an editorial position compared to their male colleagues. In other words, we estimate

$$Y_{it} = G(\alpha + \beta F_i + \gamma X_{it} + \delta_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{it} = 1$ if i is first appointed as editor or associate editor in year t and 0 otherwise, F_i is an indicator equal to 1 if author i is female, X_{it} is a set of variables controlling for author i 's academic record in year t and δ_t are year fixed-effects. We estimate regression 1 as a logistic model, i.e. $G()$ is a logistic function, and cluster standard errors at the author-level. We restrict the sample to those economists at risk i.e. who have never been in an editorial position up to the year before in a given set of journals.

We present three specifications. First, we control for the cumulative number of publications in the top-5 journals and year fixed-effects. Next, we additionally condition on the number of publications in all other 31 journals and the number of citations in the top-5 journals.¹¹ In the third specification, we add non-parametric controls for the number of top-5 publications and, as a proxy for academic age, the number of years since first publication. We always report the estimates from the latent variable model, along with standard errors in parentheses.

4.2 Baseline Results: Overall Role of Gender in Selection

We start by running pooled regressions, including all years, editorial roles and journal types. Our main finding, shown in Table 3, is clear: We do not find any indication that female economists were less likely to be appointed to editorial positions, compared to their male colleagues, conditional on their academic record. Independent of the set of controls we consider, the point estimates of the gender indicator are never significantly negative. To the contrary, in the most comprehensive specification (shown in column 3) we find evidence for

¹⁰This specification is a discrete-time approximation of the Cox hazard model (Efron, 1988).

¹¹For the number of citations, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (asinh) to approximate the natural logarithm while allowing for zeros. For $x > 2$, $\text{asinh}(x) \approx \ln(2x)$.

a significant over-selection of female economists in editorial positions, once controlling for academic achievements and age.

To translate the female coefficient into selection probabilities, take the estimated gender effects in column 3, (0.221; SE = 0.076). This coefficient implies that a female candidate is $\exp(0.221) = 1.25$ times more likely (or 25% more likely) to be selected than a male with the same publication and citation record. With respect to the other variables, and as expected, the number of top-5 publications is a strong predictor of selection. Particularly in the first specification (column 1), in which we – other than on publications – only condition on year fixed effects, these coefficients are strongly associated with a higher probability of being appointed to an editorial position in the top-15 journals in economics. When adding more controls, their individual influence vanishes and citation counts are the most important determinants (column 2). Finally, when we introduce non-parametric controls for the total number of top-5 publications (column 3), these take up a lot of predictive power and help us to further improve our model fit. Alternatively, we can compute the average partial effects for these main baseline results. As can be seen in Appendix Table A9, the significance and magnitude are equivalent to the estimates of the latent model.¹²

4.3 Heterogeneity: Sample Periods, Journal Type and Editorial Role

Overall, conditional on academic performance, women have been over-selected into editorial roles, but there could be heterogeneity over the different sample periods, across the different journal types, and editorial roles. Table 4 displays the estimated female coefficient of regression equation 1 using the third, most comprehensive specification of Table 3. We analyze heterogeneity with respect to three different sample periods (1960-1979, 1980-1999, and 2000-2019), for different journal-types (top-8 general interest and top-field journals), and by editorial role (editor versus associate editor).

Interestingly, we find important heterogeneous effects. First, as shown in row 1, the over-selection of women started as early as in the 1980s, and continued to be present in the last 20 years. In contrast, we find no sign of differential selection probabilities for the decades of 1960-1979. Second, when looking at all roles for top-8 and top-field journals separately, the over-selection of women is only present among the top-8 general interest journals. For the top-field journals, the selection into editorial roles appeared to be gender neutral. Third, differentiating by editorial role for the top-8 journals (middle panel, rows 2-3), we observe an over-selection of women into associate editor (women being over 1.9 times more likely to be selected in the 80-90s and 1.4 times more likely in 2000-2019), as well as editor

¹²For instance, in the years 2000-2009 the baseline probability of selection for men was 0.00375, so a marginal effect for women of 0.00096 percentage points translates to women being 25.6% more likely to be selected.

positions (1.7 times more likely in 2000-2019).¹³ However, when we estimate the selection for editor positions and control for previously held associate editor positions (row 4), the positive coefficient on gender is no longer statistically different from zero. This suggests that any over-selection of women into the role of editor occurred through the over-selection into associate editor roles, since past experience as associate editor is an important predictor for advancing to editor level later on, as shown in Appendix Table A10.

Last, we repeat the baseline estimations, but for each of the top-8 journals separately. As we have more observations for editorial positions, we perform this analysis for the last two decades only. Appendix Table A11 shows that the significant conditional over-selection of female candidates was particularly strong among four (AER, QJE, EJ and REStat) of the top-8 journals.¹⁴ Interestingly, the by-journal estimates also show that for getting selected into editorial roles of a given journal, past publications in the very same journals are typically the strongest predictors (compared to publications in other journals).

4.4 Robustness: Field, Connections, Extended Publication Record and Affiliations

We assess the robustness of the over-selection of women documented in the baseline results to four alternative specifications. Motivated by the heterogeneity analysis, we focus on associate editor positions at top-8 general-interest journals. The upper panel of Table 5 examines whether the results are driven by journals' demand for field diversity or by network effects. The lower panel investigates, for a restricted sample of authors, whether the baseline findings remain robust to controlling for publications in a broader set of journals and institutional affiliations. To ease comparison, we report the baseline specification for both the full sample (upper panel; identical to Table 4, row 5) and the restricted sample.

In what follows, we first analyze whether field diversity may be one channel behind the observed over-selection of women. In order to assess whether journals over-select female candidates to gain expertise in fields in which women are more likely to specialize, we compare male and female candidates with the same predicted probability of selection based on their research topics. Since there is no consistent official classification of papers into fields over our sample period (the JEL classification in its current form was introduced only in the 1990s), we proxy fields using paper titles, following a similar approach to Iaria et al. (2022). Specifically, we predict selection into editorial roles using words in the titles of authors' prior publications, treating all researchers as if they were male, and then include these predicted

¹³Note that the conditional over-selection in associate editor positions at top-8 journals since the 1980s prevails when applying Bonferroni correction (considering multiple hypothesis testing across two roles, two journal types and three time periods) since the p -values of both female coefficients are below the cutoff of 0.004.

¹⁴When repeating the same exercise for the top-field journals, the female coefficient is not significantly different from zero for any of the journals.

probabilities as additional control variables. In other words, we account for differences in selection probabilities arising from field variation across gender. If gender differences in selection persist after this adjustment, this suggests that field composition alone does not explain the over-selection of women into editorial positions.

To estimate selection probabilities, we first concatenate the titles of each researcher by decade. The words in the titles are stemmed, cleaned from stopwords, vectorized into uni- and bi-grams and re-weighted by inverse document-frequency.¹⁵ For each decade, we then regress a dummy indicating selection in decade $d + 1$ based on the titles of a researcher in the previous decade d . We combine a logistic model with lasso regularization to reduce the dimensionality of the vectorized set of titles. To find the optimal regularization parameter, we use 10-fold cross-validation choosing the model with the best performance based on McFadden’s Pseudo-Rsquared.¹⁶ The model is trained for selection at the top-8 journals for each decade from the 1960s to the 2010s based on the male sample. The top-10 predictors by decade are reported in Appendix Table A14. As an example, top keywords indicate a shift of importance from (classical) *keynesian* models in the 1960s and 1970s, to *input-output* analysis in the 1980s, monetary macro topics such as *exchange rates* and *monetary policy* in the 1990s and 2000s, and finally to non-*parametric* estimation of *marginal* effects in the 2010s.

Then, we use the coefficients obtained from the male sample, to predict selection separately by decade and journal type for all researchers in our sample. The resulting probabilities are a measure of the predicted likelihood to be selected into an editorial position based on authors’ research fields, evaluated as if they were male. Table 5 compares the baseline result in the first row, with adding the predicted selection probabilities based on field to the baseline specification. Even though field controls are important determinants of selection, as shown by the estimation results in Table A15, including them does not substantially alter the estimated gender coefficient. We therefore conclude that the over-selection of women is not primarily driven by journals’ demand for field diversity.

Second, one potential threat to the validity of the baseline results is that not only the publication record matters, but also one’s connections to authors holding editorial roles. If there are gender differences in connections, and connections affect editorial appointments, omitting a measure of connections could bias the gender coefficients in the baseline regressions. The third row in Table 5 shows the estimation of the female coefficient when we also control for the number of journals among the top-8 journals with which the economist is connected

¹⁵The stopwords are listed in Appendix Table A12.

¹⁶The optimal regularization parameters and in- and out-of-sample performance of the trained model are shown in Appendix Table A13.

through co-authorship. Undoubtedly, connections play a significant role (as can be seen in the estimated coefficients, shown in the Appendix Table A15). Since the 1980s, the number of journals an author is connected with, has been strongly positively associated with being selected for an associate editorial position. However, including this measure for connections hardly changes the conditional gender gap in selection.

Finally, we assess whether the baseline results remain robust to controlling for institutional affiliations and publications in an extended set of journals in the lower panel of Table 5. These results are based on the subset of authors with at least one publication during the last 20 years of the sample and reliable institutional affiliation information. To facilitate comparison across samples, the first row reports the baseline specification estimated on the restricted sample. The second row adds controls for the cumulative number of publications in 15 additional journals, including important field journals in macro, finance, urban and environmental economics. Gender differences in selection remain stable, consistent with the limited predictive power of the additional journals, as shown in column 2 of Appendix Table A16. In row 3 of Table 5, we further include controls for institutional rank. While affiliations to US or European top-20 departments are strongly associated with selection into associate editor roles, conditioning on affiliations does not substantially change the observed over-selection of women.

4.5 Interpretation of the Over-selection of Women

We find that women, conditional on their publication record, accumulated citations and academic age, were over-selected in the role of associate editors for general interest journals since the 1980s. For top-field journals, on the other hand, appointments into editorial roles appear gender neutral. How can we interpret this over-selection in the role of associate editors at the top-8 general interest journals?

The most straightforward explanation is that journals favor female candidates to alleviate existing gender imbalances on their editorial boards, whether due to an inherent preference for gender diversity or a desire to signal gender diversity. The fact that this pattern appears only at general-interest journals may reflect that those journals are less constrained by field requirements, or alternatively, that they find it more pressing given their visibility and prominence in the profession.

However, there are at least three alternative explanations. First, prior research (Card et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022) shows that the publication process may impose a higher bar on female authors. Editors may be aware of this disparity and, as a result, more inclined to offer editorial positions to female candidates, even if they are observationally equivalent to male candidates in terms of research productivity. For this reason, we caution against interpreting

the over-selection of women based on *observed* academic records, as preferential treatment due to gender, since publications and citations themselves might be endogenous to gender.¹⁷ Second, women may differ from men in unobservable characteristics that are beneficial to editorial work, or alternatively, journals might *expect* them to differ along these dimensions. For example, editors may view female authors as more diligent, better communicators, or more capable of finding compromises. Also in this case, the over-selection of women cannot be interpreted as preferential treatment. Third, journals may offer positions to male and female authors at equal rates, but women may be more likely to *accept* a given offer. This last explanation is assessed based on the survey evidence we present in the following section.

4.6 Mechanism: Journals' Demand versus Authors' Acceptance

We found evidence for over-selection of women into the role of associate editor in top-8 general interest journals, but no sign of it in top-field journals. Given that editorial roles are offered to authors and those can be accepted or rejected, it is relevant to be able to disentangle whether the over-selection is coming from the journals' demand side (journals being more likely to offer positions to women) or from the authors' supply side (women being more likely to accept those offers). The survey's main purpose was to determine whether the over-selection was due to the journals' offerings or the authors' acceptance of the offers.

Table 6 (upper panel) shows the gender differences in the probability of being offered an editorial position from journals.

Female respondents are more likely to be offered to serve as associate editor at top-8 journals while male respondents more frequently reported offers for associate editor positions at top-field journals. In the next step, we examine if these gender differences in the probabilities to be offered editorial positions also hold when conditioning on demographics. We find that female respondents are significantly more likely to be offered to serve as associate editor at top-8 journals and as editor at top-field journals.¹⁸

Could these differences in offers potentially be generated by gender differences in accepting referee requests, which in turn may affect the probability of being offered an editorial position? We consider this explanation unlikely, as Card et al. (2020) found no evidence for gender differences in accepting referee requests, based on editorial data from four leading journals.

¹⁷In other words, publications and citations might be considered 'bad controls'. However, they are key determinants of editorial positions and our objective is to estimate gender differences in selection probabilities *conditional on academic records*. We therefore chose to include these variables in the regressions despite this limitation – an approach consistent with the previous literature, see Card et al. (2022); Hengel (2022); Koffi (2025).

¹⁸Appendix Table A17, columns "Journals' Demand", reports the estimated coefficients for the full set of control variables. Since respondents selected for wave 1 of the survey had more publications than those in wave 2, they were significantly more likely to be offered any of the positions considered. For most positions, more senior economists had also a significant conditional advantage.

Table 6 (lower panel) shows results for the probability to accept an editorial position (conditional on getting an offer).¹⁹ Regarding unconditional acceptance probabilities, we do not find any evidence for gender differences in the probability to accept editorial positions at top-8 or top-field journals. This result also holds when conditioning on demographics.^{20,21} To confirm that the results on gender gaps in offer and acceptance rates are not due to survey response bias, we estimate a Heckman selection model (with weekdays and number of reminders as instruments). As shown in Appendix Table A18, we obtain very similar results.

The survey evidence for associate editors at top-8 journals is in line with the main regression results in Section 4.3. If our respondents are representative for our regression sample, the survey data suggest that the female over-selection is related to a higher probability of receiving an offer from the journals, and not to gender differences in the likelihood of accepting a given offer. The survey evidence for editors at top-field journals is inconsistent with the finding that women are equally likely as men to be selected for editorial positions, conditional on academic records. This divergence could stem from a variety of reasons. First, we only consider a sub-sample of top-field journals in the regressions compared to the survey. Second, the survey data offers fewer controls.

5 Potential Impact of Women in Editorial Roles

A natural question that arises from the main result above is: Which implications does the conditional over-representation of women at top-8 journals have for the journals and for the profession? We explore three of these implications: diversity in topics of published research, quality of published research, and potential trickle-down effects for publishing female authors. At the end, we will also investigate the effects of taking on editorial activities on research productivity of the editors themselves.

We use two different data sets to analyze these implications. On the one hand, we use the already introduced data sets that combine editorial roles, publication data set and paper-level data from the previous analyses. In addition, and as a complement, we assemble a new data set at the paper-level where the information on the editor handling the published paper is available. In recent years, a number of journals started publishing the name of the editor who has been in charge of the editorial decision of the published paper. We combine information on the editor-in-charge (taken directly from the first or last page of the paper), with the

¹⁹Respondents, who have both accepted and rejected offers within the same category of journals, are classified as having “ever accepted” an offer.

²⁰Appendix Table A17, columns “Author Accept. Rate”, shows again the coefficients of all control variables. Most senior economists were more likely to reject the offers from journals.

²¹We also asked respondents whether they would hypothetically accept a position which was not actually offered to them. We do not find any significant gender differences in the hypothetical acceptance probability conditional on the same controls as before.

two-digit JEL classification of each paper. We consider all journals examined in our main analysis for the years in which they published the editor-in-charge.²² We obtained the JEL codes, if available, directly from the paper,²³ and otherwise, from EconLit.²⁴ In total, this data set comprises 2,322 papers.

5.1 *Topic Diversity: Do Male and Female Editors Publish Different Papers?*

Female editors tend to publish in different journals than male editors, as shown by the descriptive statistics in the Appendix Tables A3 and A4. But do they also concentrate their editorial work — including handling and accepting papers — in different fields?

Figure 3 compares the ranks of the frequencies of JEL letters of papers accepted by male and female editors. Clearly, and as expected, given their different research profiles, there are considerable gender differences in the fields in which editors publish papers. For instance, female editors more frequently accept papers in the fields of labor and demographic economics or health, education and welfare, and much less often in the fields of mathematical and quantitative methods. A more detailed tabulation of JEL codes by rank (see Appendix Tables A19 and A20) shows that even within specific sub-fields there are considerable gender differences. Out of 20 sub-fields, there is overlap in around half of them, meaning that both male and female editors publish papers in these 10 sub-fields (e.g. J24 or D72), although they are ranked differently. However, in the other half, there is no overlap at all, suggesting that male and female editors specialize in different types of topics (e.g. male editors publish papers in D82, Mechanism Design, and female editors publish papers in J13, Fertility).

In addition, Figure 4 shows the most frequent words in abstracts published by male (upper panel) and female editors (lower panel). The word clouds are based on the stemmed nouns of the paper abstracts, with larger font size indicating higher frequency.²⁵ While male and female editors share the most common words (e.g. *model*, *effect*, *data*, *firm*), less frequent words differ substantially between editor gender. Some examples clearly illustrate these differences. The top-50 terms in abstracts published by female editors include words such as *student*, *school*, *health*, *women* and *family*. In contrast, these words are absent from the word cloud of abstracts published by male editors. Equivalently, top-50 terms in titles published by male editors contain words such *theory*, *agent* and *contract*, which do not appear in the word cloud for female editors.

Finally, and to better understand the relationship between editor gender and topic diversity,

²²I.e. the AER from 2017, the JEEA from 2008, REStud from 2018, REStat from 2014, ECMA from 2017, EJ from 2020 and the JPE from 2022 onwards.

²³I.e. AER, JEEA and REStud

²⁴I.e. REStat, ECMA and EJ. Note that EconLit only publishes JEL codes up to the year 2020, so the years 2021 and 2022 are excluded for these journals.

²⁵Before stemming, stopwords (shown in Table A12) are removed from the corpus of nouns.

we use the paper-level dataset, containing the titles of all publications of the 15 journals from 1960 to 2019 (for this large sample, we do not have abstracts). First, we construct a measure of the number of topics published by a journal in a given year. We classify the title of each paper using a transformer-based topical model. We use an S-BERT transformer to convert titles into numerical representations, so-called embeddings, which also capture the contextual meaning of words.²⁶ This procedure enables us to assign each paper to the most likely topic out of 156 potential topics (the number of topics is determined by the model). Appendix Table A21 showcases the 20 most frequent topics along with their representative keywords.

To measure topic diversity, we count the number of distinct topics published by a journal in a given year. Table 7 presents estimates from a Poisson model, regressing the number of topics on the number of new editors joining a journal’s board in a given year. To understand whether female scholars entering editorial boards is associated with greater topic diversity, we also interact the number of new editors with the female editor’s dummy.

Considering all journals (column 1) and only top-field journals (column 3), neither the total number of new editors nor the gender interaction is significantly associated with topic diversity. However, for top-8 journals (column 2), we find that an increase in female editors corresponds to a rise in the number of topics published. These results remain robust when using a one-year lag after a new editor joins the board (columns 4 and 5).²⁷

While it is still possible that female editors are appointed with the goal to increase topic diversity, our analysis in Section 4.4 suggests that this is not the whole story. We therefore conclude that female editors handle and accept papers of different fields and topics, compared to male editors, and that an increase in female editors is associated with a larger topic diversity in journals.

5.2 *Quality: Do Male and Female Editors Publish Different Quality Papers?*

We have shown that male and female editors select papers from different fields and topics in economics. However, do men and women editors differ in the quality of the papers they select? Measuring the quality of papers is not a straightforward task. Ex-post accumulated citations have been established as a good proxy of quality (Card and DellaVigna, 2020; Card et al., 2020).

In the following analysis, we predict citations in March 2024 conditional on (publication) year and journal fixed effects, paper and author characteristics as well as the gender of the editor-in-charge. This allows us to understand if, conditional on other factors influencing the citation count of a paper, female editors do equally well in maximizing the citation count

²⁶We use as a transformer “all-MiniLM-L6-v2” with a WordPiece tokenizer. To reduce the dimensionality of embeddings we use UMAP and cluster the embeddings into topics with HDBSCAN.

²⁷Further analysis shows that there are no significant additional effects when adding more than one lag.

of their journal. If the estimated coefficient of editor gender is equal to zero, this would indicate that there are no gender differences in the citation-performance between male and female editors. A positive/negative female editor dummy, on the other hand, would imply that female/male editors out-perform male/female editors in terms of citations.

We use two measures of citations as outcome variables, both in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (asinh)²⁸: first, the number of times cited in all databases and second, as a narrower citation count, times cited in Web-of-Science.²⁹ We merge the paper characteristics with authors' characteristics from our publication data set. In all our regressions we include journal-year fixed effects.

As shown in Table 8, papers edited by women accumulate significantly more cites (columns 1 and 4, under both definitions of the outcome variable). However, as soon as we also control for JEL code fixed effects (columns 2 and 5), we do not find any significant differences by editor gender anymore. Adding further paper and author characteristics such as the page count, number of authors, the maximum number of top-5 as well as the maximum number of publications over all authors, yields very similar results (columns 3 and 6). This indicates that, in fact, female and male editors perform equally well in maximizing their journal's citation count and hence, their impact factor.³⁰

5.3 Trickle-down Effects for Female Authors

Do female editors tend to publish more papers by female authors? This is a relatively natural question to ask, given existing work in related settings (see [Bagues and Esteve-Volart 2010](#), [Bagues et al. 2017](#) and [Bagues et al. 2026](#)). We study this question using two dependent variables, the fraction of female authors per published paper, and whether the published paper has at least one female author. The coefficient of interest is a dummy indicating editor gender.

Table 9 shows the results. Without paper level controls, we find that female editors tend to publish more papers by female authors. This is compatible with gender differences across topics and fields. However, once we control for paper level characteristics (in particular JEL codes, either 1 digit or 2 digits), we find no evidence of any trickle-down effects.³¹

²⁸Additional analysis (available upon request) shows that the main result, i.e. female editors do equally well in maximizing a paper's citation count conditional on its field, is robust to using a Poisson specification with citation counts in levels.

²⁹I.e. cites accumulated up to the date of data collection in March 2024.

³⁰There is a related paper which predicts citations based on variation in the share of female editors in the top-5 journals ([Bransch and Kvasnicka, 2022](#)). The authors find a positive correlation between female editorship and future citations of articles, however, they control for field through the 1-digit JEL code, while we control for the 2-digit JEL codes.

³¹We have further explored the potential trickle-down effects on authors with fewer publications and lower academic age. We do find suggestive evidence that female editors are more likely to handle and publish

5.4 Research Productivity during Editorial Service

Finally, we explore the implications of holding editorial positions for the over-selected female editors themselves. Does holding editorial positions hurt or benefit academic productivity? On the one hand, the time spent on editorial duties may come at the expense of research. On the other hand, editorial service might also benefit academic productivity, for instance, by providing networking opportunities. In the following analysis, using an event study setting, we examine if editorial service is associated with a change in academic productivity and whether these changes vary by the gender of the editor.

For this analysis, we again rely on our database of active researchers from 1960-2019 (see Section 2.2), but focus on the selected sample of scholars who have served in an editorial position at least once. For the event study analysis, we consider a time window spanning up to four years before and 5 years after the start of the *first* editorial service in a journal and show the effects on the number of published papers, for all journals but also separately for the top-8 and top-field journals. We condition on author, year and academic age fixed effects. We therefore compare researchers who all eventually serve in editorial positions but differ in the timing of their first appointment, and exploit within-scholar variation in performance, netting out life-cycle and time effects.

Figure 5 presents the event-time estimates. Reassuringly, there are no visible pre-trends in academic performance prior to the appointment. When considering all journals and years (panel a), scholars begin to publish considerably less starting from the first year after the appointment, a pattern that persists throughout the five-year window. The drop in academic output associated with the take-up of an editorial position amounts to around 0.7 fewer papers over the first 5 years. This decline in publications is more pronounced for top-8 journals (panel b) than for top-field journals (panel c), and more so for editors (panel d) than associate editors (panel e). Appendix Table A22 shows the results from interacting the event-time indicators with the female dummy. Clearly, the decline in publication output, following the start of an editorial position, does not differ between male and female scholars.³²

Given that editorial work negatively affects authors' productivity, one may wonder what motivates authors to accept editorial offers.³³ The survey we conducted can shed light on this. Figure 6 includes respondents' motivations to accept and reject editorial offers, as well

papers by less prolific authors, but we find no significant differences based on academic age. These results are available upon request.

³²Considering only top-5 publications as a measure of academic productivity, we also find significant (though mechanically smaller) drops in publications, in particular for the general interest journals and for editors. These results are available upon request.

³³We acknowledge that there could be positive longer-term benefits from editorial positions, such as visibility in the profession, promotions, or awards for scientific contributions, which we unfortunately cannot measure with our data.

as the difficulties encountered while holding an editorial position in the last 20 years.

The top panel of Figure 6 includes survey respondents that have accepted positions as editors (left figure) or associate editors (right figure). It shows how important five different motives (shaping field, serving profession, prestige, improving conditions, and financial) were in the decision to accept a given editorial position. Men and women agree on assigning very little importance to financial motivations, as well as to the motivation of using these editorial positions to reduce other administrative tasks in their daily academic life. Both men and women assign high value to serving the profession, and to the prestige associated with the editorial jobs. The most notable gender difference is that women, compared to men, tend to give more importance to the motivation of shaping the field.³⁴

What about the motivations for rejecting positions? The central panel of Figure 6 shows the reasons behind rejecting editorial positions. Both, men and women, agree on the two main motivations for rejecting editorial positions: the work involved with editorial duties and already holding enough editorial positions. Note also that especially for associate editor positions, women are more likely than men to state that they already hold enough positions, which is in line with our main finding that women are over-selected for associate editors.³⁵

With respect to difficulties experienced in editorial positions, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 6, both men and women mainly mention time costs and the difficulty in recruiting referees. Again, this is consistent with our finding that editorial positions are taxing. We also asked respondents to provide an estimate of the percent of editorial decisions that came back in the form of complaints. Appendix Table A23 shows that, if anything, male editors report a higher percent of complaints than female editors. Similarly, based on previous studies showing that women tend to devote more time to non-promotable tasks than men (Babcock et al., 2017a; Babcock et al., 2017b), we also asked our survey respondents to describe their time devoted to each of the academic tasks: administration, editorial duties, research, student supervision and teaching. As shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix, our results go in the expected direction: men tend to devote slightly more time to research while women to administrative tasks, although the differences are very minor. More importantly, the share devoted to editorial duties is very similar, suggesting that editorial work is equally taxing for men and women.

³⁴With respect to the same (hypothetical) motivations for researchers who had never been offered these positions, shown in Figure A1, we find that the three most important motivations are exactly the same, and even in the hypothetical answers, women are relatively more inclined to accept editorial positions with the purpose to shape the field.

³⁵When restricting to hypothetical responses (see Figure A1), interestingly, the two most important motivations are exactly the same, but there are some notable differences, both in the levels and ordering when compared to the actual experienced motivations. For both men and women, the responsibility involved in accepting these positions gains importance in the hypothetical responses relative to the actual motivations.

6 Conclusions

Our paper offers a comprehensive analysis of gender gaps in editorial roles at 15 highly-regarded journals in economics. We first combine newly-collected information on editorial positions with a data set on publication records, citations and connections through co-authorship of 37,000 active economists. This data set allows us to study gender differences in selection probabilities into editorial positions in the top 15 economic journals. Despite an evident unconditional under-representation of women in editorial positions, we do not find any indication that women face obstacles in becoming editor and associate editors once accounting for their academic records. On the contrary, when comparing women and men with similar academic achievements, we find that, if anything, women have had higher chances to be selected for editorial positions. In particular, we find that women are over-selected into editorial positions in the top-8 general interest journals and the role of associate editors, while we cannot rule out gender neutrality for the top-field journals. We then complement these data sets with detailed information obtained from a large-scale online survey to disentangle whether the over-selection is explained by the journals' demand side (gendered probability of offering) or the authors' supply side (gendered rate of acceptance). We find support for the offering channel.

What are the implications of having more female editors? First, we find that female editors, on average, handle and accept papers in different sub-fields than their male colleagues. Moreover, we show that female scholars entering editorial boards is associated with greater topic diversity. Second, after controlling for research field, female and male editors do not differ in the quality of their editorial decisions, as measured by future citations. Third, although female authors appear to benefit from female editors, this effect is largely explained by differences in research fields: once field characteristics are taken into account, we find no evidence that female editors are more likely than male editors to publish work by female authors. Hence, our findings suggest that top general-interest journals can increase topic diversity by over-selecting women into editorial positions at comparable levels of scientific quality. Finally, how does this over-selection affect female editors themselves? Survey evidence suggests that women are particularly motivated by the opportunity to shape the direction of the field. However, editorial service carries substantial costs, which are reflected in lower short-run research productivity.

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
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
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Figures and Tables


Figure 1: Number of Economists in Editorial Positions



(a) All 15 journals




(b) Top-8 general interest journals




(c) Top-field journals

Notes: The figures show the number of economists holding at least one position as editor or associate editor in our sample of actively publishing economists. An economist is considered active from the year of first publication in one of the 36 journals until up to 11 years after the last publication or the year in which death was recorded.


Figure 2: Female Share in Active Economists, in Editors and Associate Editors



(a) All 15 journals




(b) Top-8 general interest journals



(c) Top-field journals


Notes: The figure 2a) shows the share of women in the sample of actively publishing economists (green line), in the sample of economists with at least three top-5 publications (brown line), and in the sample of editors and associate editors at 15 journals (blue and red lines, respectively). Figure 2b) shows the share of women by different editorial roles for top-8 general interest journals. Figure 2c) shows the share of women by different editorial roles for top-field journals.

Figure 3: JEL Codes by Gender of Editors




Notes: The figure shows the ranks of JEL codes fields of accepted papers by the gender of editors.


Figure 5: Productivity – Number of Published Papers during Editorial Service




(a) All journals




(b) Top-8 journals



(c) Top-field journals




(d) Editors



(e) Associate Editors

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of publications per year. The sample consists of all active scholars who have held an editorial position in any of the 15 journals (a), top-8 (b) or top-field journals (c), or an editor or associate editor (d) position at any of the 15 journals at least once. Scholars enter the sample up to four years before their editorial service begins and remain in the sample for up to five years or until their service ends. Subsequent editorial appointments are not considered. All specifications control for author, year and academic age fixed effects. Event study dummies are defined relative to the year before the start of service. Vertical lines indicate the standard errors (clustered at the author-level) of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean

Figure 6: Motivations to Accept, Reject and Experienced Difficulties in Editorial Roles



Notes: The figures show the survey respondents' motivations to accept (top panel), to reject (central panel) editorial positions, and their experienced difficulties (bottom panel). The circles indicate the mean of the answers "Very important" (scaled as 1), "Important" (scaled as 0.5) and "Not Important" (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Editors and Associate Editors at All Journals

| Top-8 General Interest Journals | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-------------------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | Editors | | | | | | Associate Editors | | | | | |
| | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | |
| Ratio Female | 0.028 | | 0.015 | | 0.104 | | 0.022 | | 0.059 | | 0.148 | |
| Ratio Unknown Gender | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | |
| | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| <i>A. Cum. publications in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 1.68 | 0.00 | 2.30 | 0.50 | 2.19 | 0.41 | 1.68 | 0.21 | 1.95 | 0.51 | 1.43 | 0.65 |
| REStud | 1.53 | 0.00 | 1.46 | 1.88 | 1.72 | 0.76 | 1.11 | 0.07 | 1.10 | 0.40 | 1.01 | 0.38 |
| AER | 1.31 | 0.11 | 1.41 | 0.25 | 2.25 | 1.85 | 1.20 | 0.74 | 1.48 | 0.61 | 1.52 | 1.20 |
| QJE | 0.94 | 0.00 | 0.95 | 1.75 | 2.31 | 2.26 | 1.28 | 0.49 | 1.22 | 0.71 | 1.15 | 0.99 |
| JPE | 2.02 | 0.22 | 2.16 | 1.62 | 2.03 | 0.75 | 0.91 | 0.42 | 1.19 | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.53 |
| <i>B. Cum. citations in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 18.13 | 0.00 | 94.25 | 49.88 | 332.61 | 51.64 | 15.77 | 2.95 | 64.40 | 7.54 | 90.30 | 49.54 |
| REStud | 5.77 | 0.00 | 26.85 | 10.38 | 106.30 | 44.90 | 6.31 | 0.02 | 21.31 | 4.56 | 35.17 | 22.42 |
| AER | 12.00 | 0.67 | 64.46 | 6.38 | 191.00 | 169.38 | 11.64 | 8.72 | 43.88 | 11.05 | 89.29 | 58.26 |
| QJE | 3.11 | 0.00 | 19.78 | 40.25 | 303.64 | 489.56 | 7.00 | 4.49 | 26.66 | 8.72 | 114.43 | 64.42 |
| JPE | 20.91 | 0.56 | 133.20 | 82.62 | 347.29 | 69.74 | 6.66 | 1.35 | 39.39 | 22.10 | 42.12 | 28.53 |
| Years since first publication | 17.78 | 15.44 | 15.63 | 15.38 | 18.46 | 15.10 | 14.48 | 11.37 | 15.46 | 11.03 | 13.55 | 11.86 |
| Observations | 308 | 9 | 527 | 8 | 866 | 100 | 1912 | 43 | 2995 | 186 | 4155 | 721 |
| Number of Authors | 58 | 2 | 109 | 3 | 164 | 23 | 306 | 11 | 470 | 37 | 721 | 129 |
| Top-Field Journals | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Editors | | | | | | Associate Editors | | | | | |
| | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | |
| Ratio Female | 0.014 | | 0.026 | | 0.098 | | 0.036 | | 0.052 | | 0.163 | |
| Ratio Unknown Gender | 0.010 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0.068 | | 0.010 | | 0.020 | |
| | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| <i>A. Cum. publications in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 1.33 | 0.00 | 2.13 | 0.70 | 1.55 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.75 | 1.27 | 0.28 | 0.48 | 0.26 |
| REStud | 0.97 | 0.00 | 0.89 | 0.42 | 0.87 | 0.42 | 1.48 | 0.00 | 1.13 | 0.26 | 0.87 | 0.45 |
| AER | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.85 | 0.48 | 0.93 | 0.71 | 1.92 | 3.00 | 1.47 | 1.56 | 1.14 | 1.03 |
| QJE | 0.55 | 0.00 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 1.39 | 1.50 | 1.14 | 1.23 | 1.28 | 1.20 |
| JPE | 0.78 | 0.45 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.72 | 0.28 | 1.72 | 0.00 | 1.41 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| <i>B. Cum. citations in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 15.57 | 0.00 | 56.97 | 8.74 | 90.82 | 95.72 | 8.40 | 17.88 | 46.57 | 8.91 | 38.80 | 7.91 |
| REStud | 5.85 | 0.00 | 13.77 | 3.06 | 23.97 | 18.75 | 12.75 | 0.00 | 24.04 | 0.16 | 42.72 | 19.40 |
| AER | 6.75 | 0.00 | 37.20 | 7.83 | 54.16 | 51.82 | 25.71 | 59.62 | 46.57 | 36.14 | 112.03 | 44.19 |
| QJE | 4.77 | 0.00 | 8.32 | 4.83 | 46.72 | 40.58 | 12.23 | 30.88 | 15.25 | 17.21 | 158.76 | 60.82 |
| JPE | 6.76 | 0.00 | 43.03 | 7.79 | 59.21 | 12.94 | 15.75 | 0.00 | 35.37 | 2.72 | 59.09 | 12.69 |
| Years since first publication | 10.01 | 19.27 | 14.70 | 17.39 | 17.68 | 13.71 | 14.22 | 15.75 | 16.95 | 13.26 | 16.50 | 10.19 |
| Observations | 755 | 11 | 2512 | 66 | 3669 | 399 | 198 | 8 | 771 | 43 | 911 | 181 |
| Number of Authors | 174 | 2 | 346 | 11 | 576 | 67 | 39 | 2 | 111 | 7 | 138 | 26 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the set of economists serving on editorial boards of any of the 15 journals considered.

Table 2: Demographics of Survey Respondents

| Characteristic | Overall | Female | Male | Other/prefer not to say |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------------|
| Number of observations | 987 | 157 | 802 | 28 |
| When did you complete your PhD? | | | | |
| Before the 1980s | 57 (5.8%) | 5 (3.2%) | 52 (6.5%) | 0 (0%) |
| In the 1980s | 107 (11%) | 9 (5.7%) | 94 (12%) | 4 (14%) |
| In the 1990s | 252 (26%) | 32 (20%) | 212 (26%) | 8 (29%) |
| In the 2000s | 428 (43%) | 86 (55%) | 330 (41%) | 12 (43%) |
| In the 2010s or later | 143 (14%) | 25 (16%) | 114 (14%) | 4 (14%) |
| Where are you based in? | | | | |
| Europe | 528 (54%) | 71 (45%) | 442 (55%) | 15 (54%) |
| Other | 113 (11%) | 18 (11%) | 93 (12%) | 2 (7.1%) |
| US | 344 (35%) | 68 (43%) | 265 (33%) | 11 (39%) |
| Unknown | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Which broad field do you work on? | | | | |
| Applied-Empirical Micro | 488 (49%) | 104 (66%) | 374 (47%) | 10 (36%) |
| Econometrics-Theory | 201 (20%) | 14 (8.9%) | 182 (23%) | 5 (18%) |
| Macro-Finance | 162 (16%) | 22 (14%) | 136 (17%) | 4 (14%) |
| Other | 135 (14%) | 17 (11%) | 109 (14%) | 9 (32%) |
| Unknown | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Notes: The table shows the survey respondents' demographic characteristics from waves 1 and 2, excluding incomplete responses. Percentages indicate the share in the number of respondents.

Table 3: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at All Journals

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Female | -0.045 (0.078) | 0.156* (0.081) | 0.221*** (0.076) |
| <i>Cumulative publications in</i> | | | |
| Econometrica | 0.287*** (0.030) | 0.219*** (0.040) | 0.159*** (0.045) |
| REStud | 0.370*** (0.041) | 0.381*** (0.067) | 0.217*** (0.062) |
| AER | 0.165*** (0.047) | 0.003 (0.048) | 0.014 (0.055) |
| QJE | 0.231*** (0.055) | 0.105* (0.056) | 0.008 (0.066) |
| JPE | 0.036 (0.032) | 0.031 (0.044) | 0.037 (0.063) |
| EJ | | -0.064* (0.036) | 0.158*** (0.038) |
| JEEA | | 0.462*** (0.113) | 0.384*** (0.097) |
| REStat | | 0.022 (0.035) | 0.158*** (0.039) |
| <i>Cumulative citations in</i> | | | |
| Econometrica | | 0.075** (0.030) | 0.030 (0.025) |
| REStud | | -0.021 (0.044) | -0.042 (0.035) |
| AER | | 0.116*** (0.026) | -0.015 (0.025) |
| QJE | | 0.139*** (0.030) | 0.045 (0.031) |
| JPE | | 0.045 (0.029) | -0.031 (0.032) |
| Number of observations | 490706 | 490706 | 490706 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.23 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes |
| Publications in general interest/field journals | no | yes | yes |
| Levels of top-5 pubs/yr since first pub | no | no | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 4: Heterogeneity over the Sample Periods, by Journal Type and Editorial Role

| | | 1960-1979 | 1980-1999 | 2000-2019 |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| All Journals | All Roles | 0.103 (0.268) | 0.303* (0.161) | 0.207** (0.093) |
| | Associate Editor | 0.274 (0.293) | 0.47** (0.183) | 0.295*** (0.107) |
| | Editor | -0.537 (0.614) | -0.309 (0.314) | 0.07 (0.128) |
| | Editor (controlling for AE) | -0.54 (0.616) | -0.387 (0.321) | -0.013 (0.13) |
| Top-8 Journals | All Roles | 0.365 (0.297) | 0.632*** (0.188) | 0.343*** (0.113) |
| | Associate Editor | 0.325 (0.306) | 0.656*** (0.189) | 0.349*** (0.113) |
| | Editor | -0.474 (1.191) | -0.098 (0.597) | 0.546** (0.251) |
| | Editor (controlling for AE) | -0.478 (1.196) | -0.488 (0.616) | 0.286 (0.26) |
| Top-field Journals | All Roles | -0.276 (0.51) | -0.141 (0.279) | 0.072 (0.131) |
| | Associate Editor | 0.299 (0.677) | 0.092 (0.483) | 0.339 (0.256) |
| | Editor | -0.564 (0.722) | -0.275 (0.347) | -0.01 (0.148) |
| | Editor (controlling for AE) | -0.56 (0.722) | -0.285 (0.349) | -0.094 (0.155) |

Notes: The table shows the estimates of the female coefficient from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 5: Robustness: Field, Connections, Extended Publications and Affiliations

| Top-8 Journals, Associate Editor | 1960-1979 | 1980-1999 | 2000-2019 |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Full Sample</i> | | | |
| Baseline | 0.325 (0.306) | 0.656*** (0.189) | 0.349*** (0.113) |
| Field Controls | 0.525* (0.303) | 0.682*** (0.239) | 0.350*** (0.119) |
| Field Controls & Connections | 0.528* (0.304) | 0.699*** (0.237) | 0.353*** (0.121) |
| <i>Restricted Sample</i> | | | |
| Baseline | | | 0.444*** (0.123) |
| Extended Set of Publications | | | 0.435*** (0.123) |
| Extended Set of Publications & Affiliations | | | 0.427*** (0.123) |

Notes: The table shows the estimates of the female coefficient from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year in the upper panel, and for the restricted sample in the lower panel. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes associate editor for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 6: Journals' Demand vs. Authors' Acceptance Rates

| | Top-8 | | | | Top-Field | | | |
|--|---------|---------|------------------|---------|-----------|---------|------------------|---------|
| | Editor | | Associate Editor | | Editor | | Associate Editor | |
| <i>Journal's demand: Have you ever received an offer in the last 20 years?</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.338 | -0.268 | 0.379* | 0.428** | 0.278 | 0.439** | -0.320* | -0.099 |
| | (0.368) | (0.373) | (0.206) | (0.213) | (0.203) | (0.215) | (0.186) | (0.197) |
| Field, PhD decade & round | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| N | 959 | 958 | 959 | 958 | 959 | 958 | 959 | 958 |
| <i>Author's Acceptance: (If offered) Have you ever accepted such offer in the last 20 years?</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.975 | -1.805 | -0.252 | -0.347 | -0.150 | 0.300 | -0.219 | -0.473 |
| | (0.792) | (1.107) | (0.694) | (0.784) | (0.427) | (0.474) | (0.475) | (0.507) |
| Field, PhD decade & round | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| N | 72 | 65 | 187 | 142 | 205 | 205 | 364 | 329 |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains only complete survey responses. In the upper panel, the outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever been offered an editorial position in the last 20 years, and zero otherwise. In the lower panel, the outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever accepted (conditional on being offered) an editorial position in the last 20 years, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 7: Topic Diversity - Number of Topics

| | All journals | Top-8 | Top-Field | Top-8 | Top-Field |
|----------------------------|--------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| New Editor | -0.001 | -0.005 | 0.002 | | |
| | (0.003) | (0.016) | (0.004) | | |
| New Editor x Female | 0.026 | 0.071** | -0.024 | | |
| | (0.027) | (0.036) | (0.023) | | |
| Lagged New Editor | | | | -0.006 | 0.002 |
| | | | | (0.018) | (0.004) |
| Lagged New Editor x Female | | | | 0.069*** | -0.014 |
| | | | | (0.021) | (0.030) |
| Number of observations | 771 | 437 | 325 | 429 | 318 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.24 | 0.28 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Journal FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The data set contains journal-year observations of all 15 journals for which we have collected editorial information from 1960-2019. The dependent variable is the number of topics published by a journal per year. Standard errors clustered at journal-level are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 8: Citation Count by Editor Gender

| | Asinh times cited in all databases | | | Asinh times cited in Web of Science | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female Editor | 0.214*** (0.057) | 0.056 (0.058) | 0.064 (0.057) | 0.198*** (0.058) | 0.044 (0.058) | 0.052 (0.057) |
| Number of pages | | | 0.014*** (0.003) | | | 0.014*** (0.003) |
| Number of authors | | | 0.128*** (0.022) | | | 0.138*** (0.022) |
| Max. number of top-5 pub | | | 0.021*** (0.007) | | | 0.018*** (0.006) |
| Max. number of total pub | | | -0.004 (0.003) | | | -0.003 (0.003) |
| Number of observations | 2322 | 2306 | 2306 | 2322 | 2306 | 2306 |
| R-squared | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 0.47 |
| Year x journal FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| JEL-code FE | no | yes | yes | no | yes | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from a linear regression model. The data set contains all papers published by AER (2017-2022), JEEA (2008-2022), REStud (2018-2022), REStat (2014-2020), ECMA (2017-2020) and EJ (2020-2020). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.


Table 9: Female-authored Papers by Editor Gender

| | Fraction of authors female | | | At least one female author | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female Editor | 0.063*** (0.017) | 0.020 (0.017) | 0.017 (0.017) | 0.081*** (0.027) | 0.017 (0.028) | 0.017 (0.028) |
| Number of pages | | | 0.001 (0.001) | | | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Number of authors | | | -0.009 (0.006) | | | 0.073*** (0.010) |
| Max. number of top-5 pub | | | -0.003** (0.001) | | | -0.005* (0.003) |
| Max. number of total pub | | | 0.001 (0.001) | | | 0.002 (0.001) |
| Number of observations | 2322 | 2306 | 2306 | 2322 | 2306 | 2306 |
| R-squared | 0.04 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.16 |
| Year x journal FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| JEL-code FE | no | yes | yes | no | yes | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from a linear regression with journal×year fixed effects. The data set contains all papers published by AER (2017-2022), JEEA (2008-2022), REStud (2018-2022), REStat (2014-2020), ECMA (2017-2020) and EJ (2020-2020). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.


A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Hypothetical Motivations to Accept and Reject Editorial Roles



Notes: The figures show the survey respondents' motivations to accept (top panel) and to reject (bottom panel) editorial positions. The circles indicate the mean of the answers “Very important” (scaled as 1), “Important” (scaled as 0.5) and “Not Important” (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure A2: Share of Time Devoted to Different Academic Tasks



Notes: The figure shows the share of average hours by task in total average hours reported by survey respondents by editor's gender.

Table A1: List of Journals

| | |
|--|---|
| <i>A. Top-5 journals</i> | |
| American Economic Review | Quarterly Journal of Economics |
| Econometrica | Review of Economic Studies |
| Journal of Political Economy | |
| <i>B. General interest journals</i> | |
| Economic Journal | Review of Economics and Statistics |
| Journal of European Economic Association | |
| <i>C. Selected top-field journals</i> | |
| Journal of Development Economics | Journal of Labor Economics |
| Journal of Econometrics | Journal of Monetary Economics |
| Journal of Economic Theory | Journal of Public Economics |
| Journal of Finance | |
| <i>D. Other journals</i> | |
| American Economic Journal: Applied Economics | International Journal of Game Theory |
| American Economic Journal: Economic Policy | Journal of American Statistical Association |
| American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics | Journal of Economic History |
| American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | Journal of Economic Literature |
| American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings | Journal of Economic Perspectives |
| Econometric Theory | Journal of Health Economics |
| Economic Theory | Journal of International Economics |
| Economica | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Games and Economic Behavior | Quantitative Economics |
| International Economic Review | Rand Journal of Economics |
| Theoretical Economics | |

Notes: The table lists all 36 journals included in the dataset of the actively publishing economists ordered by prominence, created by [Card et al. \(2022\)](#).

Table A2: Mapping of Editorial Titles to Editorial Roles of Editor and Associate Editor

| Journal | Years | Role: Editor | Role: Associate Editor |
|---|-----------|---|---|
| American Economic Review (AER) | 1983-2019 | editor, co-editor | board of editors |
| Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) | 1911-1982 | editor | board of editors |
| | 1985-2019 | board of editors | associate editors |
| Econometrica (ECMA) | 1894-1984 | editor | |
| Journal of Political Economy (JPE) | 1933-2019 | editor, co-editor | associate editors |
| | 2016-2019 | lead editor, editor | associate editors |
| Review of Economic Studies (REStud) | 2003-2015 | lead editor, editor | |
| | 1892-2002 | editor | |
| | 2003-2019 | managing editor | editorial board, foreign editor chair, board of directors |
| Economic Journal (EJ) | 1980-2002 | managing editor | assistant editor, editorial board foreign editor, chair |
| | 1961-1979 | managing editor | editorial adviser, assistant editor |
| | 1933-1960 | managing editor | editorial board, foreign editor, chair |
| | 2012-2019 | joint managing editor | associate editor |
| | 2005-2011 | editor | associate editor |
| | 1989-2004 | managing editor | associate editor |
| | 1981-1988 | editor, managing editor | |
| | 1968-1980 | editor | |
| | 1951-1967 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 1944-1950 | editor | |
| Review of Economics and Statistics (REStat) | 1934-1943 | editor, assistant editor | |
| | 1949-2019 | editor | associate editor |
| Journal of the European Association (JEEA) | 1936-1948 | board of editors | |
| | 2004-2019 | editor, co-editor | associate editors Economic |
| Journal of Monetary Economics (JME) | 2003 | editor | associate editors |
| | 2014-2019 | editor, senior associate editor, associate editor | |
| | 2010-2013 | editor, coeditor, senior associate editor, associate editor | |
| | 2008-2009 | editor, senior associate editor, associate editor | |
| | 1995-2007 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 1985-1994 | editor, editorial board | |
| | 1983-1984 | editor, coeditor, editorial board | |
| | 1975-1982 | editor, editorial board | |
| Journal of Economic Theory (JET) | 2012-2019 | lead editor, editor, associate editor | |
| | 2000-2012 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 1969-1999 | editor, associate editor | |
| Journal of Econometrics (JEC) | 2019-2019 | managing editor, editor, associate editor | |
| | 1992-2019 | editor, associate editor | |
| Journal of Development Economics (JDE) | 1973-1991 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 2004-2019 | editor, coeditor | associate editor |
| | 1974-2003 | editor, coeditor | associate editor |
| Journal of Finance (JF) | 1996-2019 | editor, coeditor, associate editor | |
| | 1977-1995 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 1974-1977 | managing editor, coeditor, associate editor | |
| | 1964-1974 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 1948-1963 | editor, associate editor, editorial board | |
| | 1946-1947 | editor | |
| Journal of Labor Economics (JOLE) | 2009-2019 | chief editor, board of editors, associate editor | |
| | 1993-2009 | chief editor, editor | |
| Journal of Public Economics (JPubE) | 1983-1992 | editor, associate editor | |
| | 2013-2019 | editor, coeditor | |
| | 1998-2012 | editor, coeditor | associate editor |
| | 1994-1998 | editor, coeditor | advisory board |
| | 1972-1993 | editor, coeditor | associate editor |

Notes: Column 1 lists the 15 journals. Column 2 contains the periods of years for which different editorial titles existed. Column 3 includes the mapping between different editorial titles into the role of editor. Column 4 includes the mapping between different editorial titles into the role of associate editor.

Table A3: Summary Statistics for Editors and Associate Editors at Top-8 General Interest Journals

| | Editors | | | | | | Associate Editors | | | | | |
|---|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-------------------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | |
| Ratio Female | 0.028 | | 0.015 | | 0.104 | | 0.022 | | 0.059 | | 0.148 | |
| Ratio Unknown Gender | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0.000 | |
| | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| <i>A. Cum. publications in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 1.68 | 0.00 | 2.30 | 0.50 | 2.19 | 0.41 | 1.68 | 0.21 | 1.95 | 0.51 | 1.43 | 0.65 |
| REStud | 1.53 | 0.00 | 1.46 | 1.88 | 1.72 | 0.76 | 1.11 | 0.07 | 1.10 | 0.40 | 1.01 | 0.38 |
| AER | 1.31 | 0.11 | 1.41 | 0.25 | 2.25 | 1.85 | 1.20 | 0.74 | 1.48 | 0.61 | 1.52 | 1.20 |
| QJE | 0.94 | 0.00 | 0.95 | 1.75 | 2.31 | 2.26 | 1.28 | 0.49 | 1.22 | 0.71 | 1.15 | 0.99 |
| JPE | 2.02 | 0.22 | 2.16 | 1.63 | 2.03 | 0.75 | 0.91 | 0.42 | 1.19 | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.53 |
| <i>B. Cum. citations in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 18.13 | 0.00 | 94.25 | 49.88 | 332.61 | 51.64 | 15.77 | 2.95 | 64.40 | 7.54 | 90.30 | 49.54 |
| REStud | 5.77 | 0.00 | 26.85 | 10.38 | 106.30 | 44.90 | 6.31 | 0.02 | 21.31 | 4.56 | 35.17 | 22.42 |
| AER | 12.00 | 0.67 | 64.46 | 6.38 | 191.00 | 169.38 | 11.64 | 8.72 | 43.88 | 11.05 | 89.29 | 58.26 |
| QJE | 3.11 | 0.00 | 19.78 | 40.25 | 303.64 | 489.56 | 7.00 | 4.49 | 26.66 | 8.72 | 114.43 | 64.42 |
| JPE | 20.91 | 0.56 | 133.20 | 82.63 | 347.29 | 69.74 | 6.66 | 1.35 | 39.39 | 22.10 | 42.12 | 28.53 |
| <i>C. Cum. publications in other journals</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JEP+JEL | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 1.08 | 0.98 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.36 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0.51 |
| AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings | 1.03 | 0.11 | 1.32 | 0.75 | 2.02 | 2.41 | 0.94 | 0.28 | 1.21 | 0.61 | 0.89 | 1.09 |
| JEEA | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 1.13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.39 |
| EJ | 1.86 | 1.78 | 0.99 | 0.38 | 1.22 | 0.37 | 0.74 | 0.14 | 0.57 | 0.10 | 0.52 | 0.32 |
| REStat | 1.44 | 0.00 | 0.58 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 0.55 | 1.69 | 0.95 | 1.21 | 0.11 | 0.46 | 0.40 |
| Economica+IER | 1.05 | 0.00 | 0.93 | 0.75 | 0.82 | 0.51 | 0.93 | 0.00 | 0.94 | 0.45 | 0.41 | 0.14 |
| Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMathE) | 0.30 | 0.00 | 1.61 | 1.25 | 3.09 | 0.39 | 0.30 | 0.02 | 1.09 | 1.06 | 2.13 | 0.63 |
| Econometrics (EcT+Jec+JASA) | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.85 | 0.00 | 1.12 | 0.18 | 0.46 | 0.14 | 1.23 | 0.00 | 1.08 | 0.83 |
| Micro (AEJMicro) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.06 |
| Macro (AEJMacro+JME) | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.63 | 1.21 | 0.50 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.22 | 0.48 | 0.32 |
| AEJApplied | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.22 |
| QE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| Development (JDE) | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.38 | 0.26 | 0.48 | 0.01 | 0.23 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 0.31 |
| Finance (JF) | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.30 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.39 | 0.05 | 0.25 | 0.14 |
| Health (JHE) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.15 |
| History (JEH) | 0.00 | 0.89 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.12 | 0.60 | 0.05 | 0.36 |
| International (JIE) | 0.18 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.75 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.35 |
| Industrial Organization (RAND) | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.56 | 0.32 | 0.09 | 0.35 | 0.54 | 0.69 | 0.47 | 0.30 |
| Labor (JoLE) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.56 | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.30 | 0.19 | 0.32 |
| Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy) | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.62 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 1.42 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.59 | 0.28 | 0.62 | 0.64 |
| Years since first publication | 17.78 | 15.44 | 15.63 | 15.38 | 18.46 | 15.10 | 14.48 | 11.37 | 15.46 | 11.03 | 13.55 | 11.86 |
| Observations | 308 | 9 | 527 | 8 | 866 | 100 | 1912 | 43 | 2995 | 186 | 4155 | 721 |
| Number of Authors | 58 | 2 | 109 | 3 | 164 | 23 | 306 | 11 | 470 | 37 | 721 | 129 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the set of economists serving on editorial boards of a top-5 or general interest journal.

Table A4: Summary Statistics for Editors and Associate Editors at Top-field Journals

| | Editors | | | | | | Associate Editors | | | | | |
|---|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-------------------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | | 1960-1979 | | 1980-1999 | | 2000-2019 | |
| Ratio Female | 0.014 | | 0.026 | | 0.098 | | 0.036 | | 0.052 | | 0.163 | |
| Ratio Unknown Gender | 0.010 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0.068 | | 0.010 | | 0.020 | |
| | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| <i>A. Cum. publications in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 1.33 | 0.00 | 2.13 | 0.70 | 1.55 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.75 | 1.27 | 0.28 | 0.48 | 0.26 |
| REStud | 0.97 | 0.00 | 0.89 | 0.42 | 0.87 | 0.42 | 1.48 | 0.00 | 1.13 | 0.26 | 0.87 | 0.45 |
| AER | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.85 | 0.48 | 0.93 | 0.71 | 1.92 | 3.00 | 1.47 | 1.56 | 1.14 | 1.03 |
| QJE | 0.55 | 0.00 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 1.39 | 1.50 | 1.14 | 1.23 | 1.28 | 1.20 |
| JPE | 0.78 | 0.45 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.72 | 0.28 | 1.72 | 0.00 | 1.41 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| <i>B. Cum. citations in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 15.57 | 0.00 | 56.97 | 8.74 | 90.82 | 95.72 | 8.40 | 17.88 | 46.57 | 8.91 | 38.80 | 7.91 |
| REStud | 5.85 | 0.00 | 13.77 | 3.06 | 23.97 | 18.75 | 12.75 | 0.00 | 24.04 | 0.16 | 42.72 | 19.40 |
| AER | 6.75 | 0.00 | 37.20 | 7.83 | 54.16 | 51.82 | 25.71 | 59.63 | 46.57 | 36.14 | 112.03 | 44.19 |
| QJE | 4.77 | 0.00 | 8.32 | 4.83 | 46.72 | 40.58 | 12.23 | 30.88 | 15.25 | 17.21 | 158.76 | 60.82 |
| JPE | 6.76 | 0.00 | 43.03 | 7.79 | 59.21 | 12.94 | 15.75 | 0.00 | 35.37 | 2.72 | 59.09 | 12.69 |
| <i>C. Cum. publications in other journals</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JEP+JEL | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.23 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.45 |
| AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.73 | 0.61 | 0.53 | 0.88 | 1.38 | 1.15 | 1.26 | 0.96 | 0.96 |
| JEEA | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.59 | 1.08 |
| EJ | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.08 | 0.30 | 0.15 | 0.86 | 1.50 | 0.88 | 0.51 | 0.90 | 0.30 |
| REStat | 0.56 | 0.91 | 0.33 | 0.82 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 1.12 | 1.50 | 0.75 | 0.67 | 0.62 | 0.36 |
| Economica+IER | 0.82 | 0.00 | 0.96 | 0.15 | 0.78 | 0.15 | 1.19 | 0.25 | 1.14 | 0.30 | 0.61 | 0.01 |
| Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMathE) | 1.03 | 0.00 | 2.08 | 0.82 | 2.80 | 0.72 | 0.34 | 0.25 | 0.91 | 1.42 | 0.79 | 0.46 |
| Econometrics (EcT+Jec+JASA) | 0.64 | 0.00 | 1.81 | 0.17 | 3.22 | 2.23 | 0.08 | 1.50 | 0.37 | 0.58 | 0.19 | 0.00 |
| Micro (AEJMicro) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Macro (AEJMacro+JME) | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.69 | 1.03 | 0.72 | 0.58 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.46 | 0.10 |
| AEJApplied | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.54 |
| QE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| Development (JDE) | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.75 | 0.81 | 1.26 | 1.59 | 1.41 |
| Finance (JF) | 1.42 | 1.09 | 1.81 | 0.36 | 1.16 | 1.19 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
| Health (JHE) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.24 |
| History (JEH) | 0.02 | 0.91 | 0.05 | 0.73 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.44 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| International (JIE) | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.89 |
| Industrial Organization (RAND) | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.11 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.91 | 0.23 | 0.20 |
| Labor (JoLE) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 0.44 | 0.04 | 0.24 |
| Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy) | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.02 | 0.69 | 0.34 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 2.45 | 1.65 | 2.40 | 1.05 |
| Years since first publication | 10.01 | 19.27 | 14.70 | 17.39 | 17.68 | 13.71 | 14.22 | 15.75 | 16.95 | 13.26 | 16.50 | 10.19 |
| Observations | 755 | 11 | 2512 | 66 | 3669 | 399 | 198 | 8 | 771 | 43 | 911 | 181 |
| Number of Authors | 174 | 2 | 346 | 11 | 576 | 67 | 39 | 2 | 111 | 7 | 138 | 26 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the set of economists serving on editorial boards of a top-field journal.

Table A5: Summary Statistics on Affiliations and Extended Set of Publications for Editors and Associate Editors at Top-8 General Interest Journals

| | Editor | | Associate Editor | |
|---|--------|--------|------------------|--------|
| | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| <i>A. Main affiliation</i> | | | | |
| US top 10 | 0.575 | 0.491 | 0.292 | 0.361 |
| US top 11-20 | 0.082 | 0.109 | 0.167 | 0.166 |
| US top 21-50 | 0.016 | 0.000 | 0.089 | 0.082 |
| Europe top 20 | 0.205 | 0.200 | 0.224 | 0.177 |
| Other top 20 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.027 | 0.000 |
| <i>B. Cum. publications in</i> | | | | |
| Econometrica | 2.351 | 0.364 | 1.539 | 0.633 |
| REStud | 1.774 | 0.909 | 1.067 | 0.381 |
| AER | 2.336 | 1.873 | 1.547 | 1.299 |
| QJE | 2.465 | 3.127 | 1.090 | 1.126 |
| JPE | 2.126 | 0.909 | 0.738 | 0.538 |
| Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | 0.212 | 0.109 | 0.175 | 0.100 |
| Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 0.116 | 0.055 | 0.260 | 0.252 |
| Regional Science and Urban Economics | 0.080 | 0.127 | 0.090 | 0.029 |
| Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 0.074 | 0.000 | 0.055 | 0.024 |
| The Journal of Human Resources | 0.213 | 0.000 | 0.078 | 0.217 |
| Management Science | 0.083 | 0.000 | 0.081 | 0.069 |
| Journal of Financial Economics | 0.256 | 0.127 | 0.102 | 0.069 |
| Journal of Urban Economics | 0.229 | 0.000 | 0.126 | 0.036 |
| Journal of Economic Growth | 0.409 | 0.109 | 0.093 | 0.002 |
| Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | 0.213 | 0.055 | 0.066 | 0.031 |
| Economics of Education Review | 0.024 | 0.036 | 0.032 | 0.057 |
| Experimental Economics | 0.019 | 0.000 | 0.102 | 0.086 |
| Labour Economics | 0.117 | 0.127 | 0.055 | 0.111 |
| Review of Economic Dynamics | 0.223 | 0.036 | 0.136 | 0.069 |
| Observations | 699 | 55 | 3015 | 548 |
| Number of Authors | 124 | 14 | 529 | 96 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the restricted sample of economists (see Appendix B for details) serving on editorial boards of top-8 general interest journals.

Table A6: Summary Statistics on Affiliations and Extended Set of Publications for Editors and Associate Editors at Top-Field Journals

| | Editor | | Associate Editor | |
|---|--------|--------|------------------|--------|
| | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| <i>A. Main affiliation</i> | | | | |
| US top 10 | 0.229 | 0.300 | 0.232 | 0.186 |
| US top 11-20 | 0.191 | 0.258 | 0.138 | 0.347 |
| US top 21-50 | 0.118 | 0.174 | 0.130 | 0.212 |
| Europe top 20 | 0.103 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.161 |
| Other top 20 | 0.053 | 0.003 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| <i>B. Cum. publications in</i> | | | | |
| Econometrica | 1.557 | 1.024 | 0.481 | 0.364 |
| REStud | 0.833 | 0.359 | 0.923 | 0.475 |
| AER | 0.904 | 0.770 | 1.207 | 0.975 |
| QJE | 0.499 | 0.557 | 1.402 | 1.144 |
| JPE | 0.709 | 0.247 | 0.617 | 0.373 |
| Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | 0.253 | 0.101 | 0.118 | 0.000 |
| Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 0.117 | 0.045 | 0.140 | 0.034 |
| Regional Science and Urban Economics | 0.083 | 0.007 | 0.238 | 0.110 |
| Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 0.040 | 0.007 | 0.085 | 0.025 |
| The Journal of Human Resources | 0.070 | 0.220 | 0.142 | 0.542 |
| Management Science | 0.091 | 0.125 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| Journal of Financial Economics | 0.685 | 0.655 | 0.151 | 0.000 |
| Journal of Urban Economics | 0.088 | 0.049 | 0.217 | 0.000 |
| Journal of Economic Growth | 0.036 | 0.000 | 0.326 | 0.008 |
| Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | 0.093 | 0.000 | 0.077 | 0.000 |
| Economics of Education Review | 0.029 | 0.289 | 0.007 | 0.042 |
| Experimental Economics | 0.043 | 0.007 | 0.033 | 0.025 |
| Labour Economics | 0.062 | 0.045 | 0.110 | 0.127 |
| Review of Economic Dynamics | 0.150 | 0.028 | 0.075 | 0.000 |
| Observations | 2687 | 287 | 702 | 118 |
| Number of Authors | 424 | 46 | 106 | 18 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the restricted sample of economists (see Appendix B for details) serving on editorial boards of top-field journals.

Table A7: Summary Statistics for Actively Publishing Economists

| | 1960-1979 | | | 1980-1999 | | | 2000-2019 | | |
|---|-----------|-------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| | All | Male | Female | All | Male | Female | All | Male | Female |
| Ratio Female | 0.042 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.086 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.176 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Ratio First Initial Only (Unknown Gender) | 0.073 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.033 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Ratio Full Name (Unknown Gender) | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.027 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.019 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Editor (in at least one out of 15) | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.006 | 0.018 | 0.020 | 0.005 | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.009 |
| Associate Editor (in at least one out of 15) | 0.029 | 0.032 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.025 | 0.014 | 0.019 | 0.020 | 0.015 |
| <i>A. Cum. publications in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0.35 | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.06 |
| REStud | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.06 |
| AER | 0.34 | 0.38 | 0.21 | 0.31 | 0.35 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.15 |
| QJE | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.08 |
| JPE | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.06 |
| <i>B. Cum. citations in top-5</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Econometrica | 1.94 | 2.15 | 0.59 | 7.84 | 9.01 | 1.01 | 20.96 | 25.44 | 3.66 |
| REStud | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.33 | 2.58 | 2.95 | 0.46 | 7.51 | 8.94 | 2.12 |
| AER | 1.81 | 2.04 | 1.01 | 7.50 | 8.50 | 2.29 | 21.05 | 24.15 | 9.94 |
| QJE | 0.84 | 0.92 | 0.65 | 2.65 | 2.97 | 1.10 | 14.86 | 17.14 | 6.70 |
| JPE | 1.44 | 1.62 | 0.58 | 6.66 | 7.59 | 1.75 | 16.31 | 19.55 | 4.01 |
| <i>C. Cum. publications in other journals</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| JEP+JEL | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.08 |
| AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.14 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.22 |
| JEEA | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05 |
| EJ | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.24 | 0.12 |
| REStat | 0.35 | 0.38 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.15 |
| Economica+IER | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 0.32 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.12 |
| Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMathE) | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.36 | 0.39 | 0.16 | 0.82 | 0.94 | 0.37 |
| Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA) | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.39 | 0.15 | 0.49 | 0.56 | 0.20 |
| Micro (AEJMicro) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Macro (AEJMacro+JME) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.09 |
| AEJApplied | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| QE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Development (JDE) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.15 |
| Finance (JF) | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.17 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.11 |
| Health (JHE) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.17 |
| History (JEH) | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05 |
| International (JIE) | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.12 |
| Industrial Organization (RAND) | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.07 |
| Labor (JoLE) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy) | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.19 |
| Number of years since the first publication | 9.30 | 9.60 | 8.40 | 10.03 | 10.49 | 6.99 | 11.27 | 12.14 | 7.85 |
| Observations | 74419 | 63932 | 3126 | 171415 | 146415 | 14736 | 309906 | 247224 | 54532 |
| Number of Authors | 8508 | 7167 | 414 | 16867 | 13969 | 1753 | 30844 | 23712 | 6021 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the sample of actively publishing economists. An economist is considered active from the year of first publication in one of the 36 journals until up to 11 years after the last publication or the year in which death was recorded.

Table A8: Summary Statistics on Affiliations and Extended Set of Publications for all Authors

| | Male | Female |
|---|--------|--------|
| <i>A. Main affiliation</i> | | |
| US top 10 | 0.093 | 0.078 |
| US top 11-20 | 0.059 | 0.058 |
| US top 21-50 | 0.083 | 0.085 |
| Europe top 20 | 0.080 | 0.076 |
| Other top 20 | 0.050 | 0.039 |
| <i>B. Cum. publications in</i> | | |
| Econometrica | 0.330 | 0.056 |
| REStud | 0.207 | 0.065 |
| AER | 0.356 | 0.150 |
| QJE | 0.188 | 0.085 |
| JPE | 0.219 | 0.064 |
| Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | 0.162 | 0.064 |
| Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 0.180 | 0.116 |
| Regional Science and Urban Economics | 0.080 | 0.032 |
| Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 0.083 | 0.056 |
| The Journal of Human Resources | 0.033 | 0.053 |
| Management Science | 0.113 | 0.046 |
| Journal of Financial Economics | 0.140 | 0.051 |
| Journal of Urban Economics | 0.103 | 0.036 |
| Journal of Economic Growth | 0.024 | 0.011 |
| Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | 0.052 | 0.012 |
| Economics of Education Review | 0.047 | 0.060 |
| Experimental Economics | 0.046 | 0.030 |
| Labour Economics | 0.063 | 0.060 |
| Review of Economic Dynamics | 0.053 | 0.024 |
| Observations | 156392 | 34339 |
| Number of Authors | 14191 | 3826 |

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the restricted sample of economists (see Appendix B for details).

Table A9: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at All Journals

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Female | -0.00018 (0.00031) | 0.00068* (0.00037) | 0.00096*** (0.00036) |
| Number of observations | 490706 | 490706 | 490706 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes |
| Publications in general interest/field journals | no | yes | yes |
| Levels of top-5 pubs/yrs since first pub | no | no | yes |

Notes: The table shows the average marginal effects of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A10: Selection into Editors at Top-8 Journals

| | 1960-1979 | 1980-1999 | 2000-2019 |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Female | -0.478 (1.196) | -0.488 (0.616) | 0.286 (0.260) |
| Past AE | 2.693*** (0.563) | 2.347*** (0.366) | 1.938*** (0.281) |
| Number of observations | 61467 | 159494 | 298521 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.40 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes |
| Publications in general interest/field journals | yes | yes | yes |
| Levels of top-5 pubs/yrs since first pub | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A11: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-8 Journals: By Journal

| | ECMA | AER | JPE | QJE | EJ | JEEA | REStat | REStud |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Female Economist*(2000-09) | 0.395 (0.433) | 1.102*** (0.275) | 1.268 (0.905) | 0.398 (0.672) | 0.718** (0.349) | -0.001 (0.300) | 0.754** (0.347) | 0.113 (0.375) |
| Female Economist*(2010-19) | -0.106 (0.429) | 0.486* (0.270) | -0.535 (0.616) | 0.950** (0.430) | 0.517 (0.360) | 0.431* (0.246) | 0.392 (0.397) | 0.395 (0.244) |
| Cumulative number of papers in Econometrica | 0.054 (0.123) | 0.018 (0.102) | 0.026 (0.215) | 0.204 (0.237) | -0.324 (0.251) | -0.261 (0.167) | 0.053 (0.312) | 0.062 (0.090) |
| Asinh citations in Econometrica | 0.242*** (0.058) | 0.007 (0.051) | 0.026 (0.111) | 0.084 (0.102) | 0.051 (0.102) | 0.040 (0.056) | 0.085 (0.124) | 0.016 (0.056) |
| Cumulative number of papers in REStud | -0.053 (0.124) | -0.064 (0.098) | -0.454 (0.303) | -0.571*** (0.205) | 0.308* (0.177) | -0.030 (0.165) | 0.290 (0.298) | 0.440*** (0.162) |
| Asinh citations in REStud | 0.006 (0.074) | 0.041 (0.054) | -0.056 (0.140) | 0.219** (0.093) | -0.172 (0.110) | 0.038 (0.067) | -0.115 (0.117) | -0.146* (0.078) |
| Cumulative number of papers in AER | 0.009 (0.116) | 0.133* (0.071) | 0.177 (0.151) | 0.585*** (0.119) | -0.156 (0.194) | -0.192 (0.157) | 0.127 (0.133) | -0.253* (0.133) |
| Asinh citations in AER | -0.073 (0.071) | 0.056 (0.046) | -0.183* (0.108) | -0.229*** (0.083) | -0.136 (0.084) | -0.067 (0.057) | 0.047 (0.078) | 0.017 (0.059) |
| Cumulative number of papers in QJE | -0.119 (0.228) | -0.181** (0.083) | -0.314* (0.165) | 0.449*** (0.162) | 0.032 (0.221) | 0.049 (0.138) | 0.455*** (0.173) | 0.174 (0.148) |
| Asinh citations in QJE | -0.043 (0.069) | 0.068 (0.047) | 0.074 (0.078) | 0.158* (0.094) | 0.015 (0.091) | -0.086 (0.065) | 0.054 (0.077) | -0.124** (0.062) |
| Cumulative number of papers in JPE | -0.111 (0.194) | 0.014 (0.090) | 0.337** (0.158) | 0.171 (0.165) | -0.015 (0.229) | -0.148 (0.167) | 0.082 (0.166) | -0.114 (0.185) |
| Asinh citations in JPE | -0.026 (0.073) | -0.062 (0.051) | -0.128 (0.097) | -0.036 (0.092) | -0.237*** (0.085) | -0.135** (0.065) | -0.033 (0.079) | -0.006 (0.079) |
| Cumulative number of papers in EJ | -0.108 (0.172) | -0.186 (0.129) | -0.138 (0.239) | 0.208* (0.124) | 0.427*** (0.091) | 0.327*** (0.080) | -0.249 (0.267) | 0.237* (0.126) |
| Cumulative number of papers in JEEA | 0.221 (0.157) | 0.090 (0.086) | -0.173 (0.249) | 0.116 (0.121) | 0.300** (0.131) | 0.550*** (0.100) | 0.291 (0.205) | 0.295** (0.146) |
| Cumulative number of papers in REStat | 0.134 (0.131) | -0.016 (0.090) | 0.199 (0.187) | -0.214 (0.189) | 0.175 (0.158) | 0.069 (0.127) | 0.359*** (0.137) | -0.110 (0.177) |
| Number of observations | 305644 | 305162 | 204122 | 241840 | 259124 | 258174 | 178077 | 282958 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.38 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.40 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.31 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Pubs in general interest/field journals | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Levels of top-5 pubs/yr since first pub | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at the respective journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A12: Stopwords

a, about, above, according, across, actual, added, after, against, ahead, all, almost, alone, along, also, among, amongst, an, and, and-or, and/or, anon, another, any, are, arising, around, as, at, award, away, be, because, become, becomes, been, before, behind, being, below, best, better, between, beyond, birthday, both, but, by, can, certain, come, comes, coming, completely, concerning, consider, considered, considering, consisting, de, department, der, despite, discussion, do, does, doesnt, doing, down, dr, du, due, during, each, either, especially, et, few, for, forward, from, further, get, give, given, giving, has, have, having, his, honor, how, in, inside, instead, into, is, it, its, japanese, japan, just, let, lets, little, look, looks, made, make, makes, making, many, meet, meets, more, most, much, must, my, near, nearly, next, not, now, of, off, on, only, onto, or, other, our, out, outside, over, overall, per, possibly, post, pt, put, really, regarding, reprinted, same, seen, several, should, shown, since, so-called, some, spp, studies, study, such, take, taken, takes, taking, than, that, the, their, them, then, there, therefrom, these, they, this, those, through, throughout, to, together, toward, towards, under, undergoing, up, upon, upward, various, versus, very, via, vol, vols, vs, was, way, ways, we, were, what, whats, when, where, which, while, whither, who, whom, whos, whose, why, with, within, without, yet, you, your, 1990s, 1990, 2000, ex, bad

Notes: Stopwords are based on the Web of Science catalogue.

Table A13: Model Performance

| | 1960s | 1970s | 1980s | 1990s | 2000s | 2010s |
|---------------------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| Chosen regularization parameter | 9.4444 | 17.8889 | 13.6667 | 11.5556 | 17.8889 | 5.2222 |
| Out-of-sample Pseudo-Rsquared | 0.0609 | 0.1035 | 0.3605 | 0.3362 | 0.3868 | 0.2399 |
| In-sample Pseudo-Rsquared | 0.8970 | 0.9358 | 0.8969 | 0.8446 | 0.8384 | 0.4877 |

Notes: Results are based on logistic regressions with lasso regularization. The optimal regularization parameter was chosen over the interval [1, 20]. The in-sample Pseudo-Rsquared is based on the whole data set used in the cross-validation (i.e. over all 10 folds, both the data used to train and to evaluate the model). The out-of-sample Pseudo-Rsquared is computed based on data that was not used in the cross-validation.

Table A14: Top-10 Word Predictors of Selection in Top-8 Journals

| Rank | 1960s | 1970s | 1980s | 1990s | 2000s | 2010s |
|------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1 | keynesian | incid | joint | exchang rate | monetari polici | paramet |
| 2 | monopolist | sensit | equilibria | vari | interact | margin |
| 3 | invest criteria | surplus | term structur | subsidi | advers select | commit |
| 4 | econometr | activ | intern trade | equival | good | infer |
| 5 | share | analysis | input output | integr | multipl | rise |
| 6 | oligopoli | technolog chang | function form | influenc | qualiti | open |
| 7 | product | invest behavior | theorem | consumpt | import | partial |
| 8 | industri growth | optimum | major | likelihood estim | sid | semiparametr |
| 9 | wage | specif | random | school | explain | vote |
| 10 | save | keynesian | survey | common | natur | health |

Notes: The table shows the top-10 uni- and bi-grams predicting selection at the top-8 journals.

Table A15: Selection into Associate Editors at Top-8 Journals: Robustness Topic and Connections Controls

| | 1960-1979 | | | 1980-1999 | | | 2000-2019 | | |
|------------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Female | 0.325 (0.306) | 0.525* (0.303) | 0.528* (0.304) | 0.656*** (0.189) | 0.682*** (0.239) | 0.699*** (0.237) | 0.349*** (0.113) | 0.350*** (0.119) | 0.353*** (0.121) |
| Predicted sel. prob | | 4.178*** (0.323) | 4.197*** (0.323) | | 5.143*** (0.287) | 5.154*** (0.290) | | 3.678*** (0.343) | 3.590*** (0.344) |
| Connections to Editor | | | 0.006 (0.463) | | | 0.648*** (0.171) | | | 0.435*** (0.103) |
| Connections to AE | | | -0.136 (0.176) | | | -0.077 (0.098) | | | 0.103** (0.050) |
| Number of observations | 63032 | 63032 | 63032 | 152870 | 152870 | 152870 | 286756 | 286756 | 286756 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.18 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.35 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates of the female coefficient from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the full sample. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes associate editor at a top-8 journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A16: Selection into Associate Editors at Top-8 Journals: Robustness Affiliation and Other Publications Controls

| | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Female | 0.444*** (0.123) | 0.435*** (0.123) | 0.427*** (0.123) |
| Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | | -0.095 (0.096) | -0.065 (0.092) |
| Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | | -0.045 (0.080) | 0.001 (0.076) |
| Regional Science and Urban Economics | | 0.119 (0.097) | 0.116 (0.105) |
| Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | | -0.037 (0.072) | -0.016 (0.074) |
| The Journal of Human Resources | | -0.044 (0.165) | 0.008 (0.165) |
| Management Science | | -0.064 (0.086) | -0.085 (0.096) |
| Journal of Financial Economics | | -0.228* (0.125) | -0.214* (0.122) |
| Journal of Urban Economics | | -0.112 (0.104) | -0.099 (0.103) |
| Journal of Economic Growth | | -0.081 (0.195) | -0.025 (0.182) |
| Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | | -0.114 (0.176) | -0.091 (0.181) |
| Economics of Education Review | | -0.257 (0.213) | -0.252 (0.223) |
| Experimental Economics | | -0.011 (0.133) | -0.013 (0.136) |
| Labour Economics | | -0.238 (0.189) | -0.157 (0.191) |
| Review of Economic Dynamics | | -0.077 (0.128) | -0.075 (0.127) |
| US top 10 | | | 0.741*** (0.142) |
| US top 11-20 | | | 0.656*** (0.153) |
| US top 21-50 | | | 0.044 (0.184) |
| Europe top 20 | | | 1.375*** (0.150) |
| Other top 20 | | | -0.038 (0.271) |
| Number of observations | 183927 | 183927 | 183927 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.37 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes |
| Pubs in general interest/field journals | yes | yes | yes |
| Levels of top-5 pubs/yrs since first pub | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The table shows the estimates of the female coefficient from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the restricted sample. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes associate editor at a top-8 journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A17: Journals' Demand vs. Authors' Acceptance Rates: All Coefficients

| | Top-8 | | | | Top-Field | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Journals' Demand | | Author Accept. Rate | | Journals' Demand | | Author Accept. Rate | |
| | Editor | Associate Editor | Editor | Associate Editor | Editor | Associate Editor | Editor | Associate Editor |
| Female | -0.268 (0.373) | 0.428** (0.213) | -1.805 (1.107) | -0.347 (0.784) | 0.439** (0.215) | -0.099 (0.197) | 0.300 (0.474) | -0.473 (0.507) |
| Round 1 | 1.924*** (0.472) | 1.185*** (0.218) | | -1.024 (0.946) | 1.050*** (0.205) | 0.987*** (0.161) | 1.241*** (0.419) | 0.338 (0.444) |
| Micro | 0.212 (0.423) | 0.184 (0.262) | -1.108 (1.462) | 0.782 (0.680) | 0.387 (0.269) | -0.036 (0.230) | 0.040 (0.524) | 0.060 (0.483) |
| Macro | 0.800* (0.450) | 0.247 (0.308) | -0.050 (1.555) | 1.050 (0.933) | 0.061 (0.318) | 0.262 (0.266) | 1.647* (0.939) | 0.613 (0.675) |
| Metrics | 0.044 (0.475) | -0.330 (0.313) | -0.166 (1.493) | | -0.241 (0.308) | 0.174 (0.253) | 0.094 (0.671) | -0.366 (0.511) |
| Before the 1980s | 0.728 (0.800) | 0.081 (0.433) | -3.042** (1.208) | -1.349 (0.999) | 1.275*** (0.385) | 1.143*** (0.364) | 0.082 (0.679) | -1.148** (0.533) |
| In the 1980s | 1.283* (0.673) | 0.312 (0.346) | -2.179** (0.933) | 0.312 (0.959) | 1.089*** (0.345) | 1.002*** (0.299) | 0.548 (0.699) | -0.442 (0.454) |
| In the 1990s | 0.838 (0.641) | -0.183 (0.307) | (1.040) | -0.862 (0.795) | 0.502 (0.306) | 0.362 (0.251) | 0.947 (0.650) | -0.586 (0.454) |
| In the 2000s | 0.815 (0.624) | -0.077 (0.278) | | | -0.074 (0.298) | -0.045 (0.236) | 0.218 (0.573) | |
| Number of observations | 959 | 959 | 65 | 142 | 959 | 959 | 205 | 329 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.04 |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains all complete survey responses. The outcome variables are: an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever been offered an editorial position, and zero otherwise, and an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever accepted an editorial position, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A18: Journals' Demand vs. Authors' Acceptance Rates: Heckman Selection

| | Top-8 | | | | Top-Field | | | |
|--|---------|---------|------------------|---------|-----------|---------|------------------|---------|
| | Editor | | Associate Editor | | Editor | | Associate Editor | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| <i>Journal's demand: Have you ever received an offer in the last 20 years?</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.009 | -0.010 | 0.072** | 0.067* | 0.074** | 0.085** | -0.015 | -0.006 |
| | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.035) | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.042) | (0.045) |
| Field, PhD decade & round | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| No. of observations | 938 | 7,559 | 938 | 7,559 | 938 | 7,559 | 938 | 7,559 |
| <i>Author's Acceptance: (If offered) Have you ever accepted such offer in the last 20 years?</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.211 | -0.210 | -0.028 | -0.031 | 0.041 | -0.008 | -0.045 | -0.043 |
| | (0.147) | (0.157) | (0.047) | (0.082) | (0.075) | (0.102) | (0.047) | (0.047) |
| Field, PhD decade & round | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Number of observations | 70 | 7,560 | 182 | 7,560 | 199 | 7,560 | 357 | 7,560 |

Notes: The table shows the estimates from a linear regression model (odd-numbered columns) and a Heckman two-step selection model. The sample includes all active researchers who had published at least three times between 2000 and 2019 in any of the 36 journals in our dataset and at least once in any of the top-8 or top-field journals that we consider in our regression. The outcome variables are: an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever been offered an editorial position, and zero otherwise, and an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever accepted an editorial position, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A19: 20 Most Frequent JEL Codes of Papers Edited by Male Editors

| Rank | Frequency | JEL code | Description |
|------|-----------|----------|--|
| 1 | 144 | D83 | Search - Learning - Information and Knowledge - Communication - Belief - Unawareness |
| 2 | 136 | D82 | Asymmetric and Private Information - Mechanism Design |
| 3 | 85 | D72 | Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| 4 | 81 | E32 | Business Fluctuations - Cycles |
| 5 | 65 | J24 | Human Capital - Skills - Occupational Choice - Labor Productivity |
| 6 | 62 | D91 | Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making |
| 7 | 61 | D12 | Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis |
| 8 | 56 | E24 | Employment - Unemployment - Wages - Intergenerational Income Distribution - Aggregate Human Capital - Aggregate Labor Productivity |
| 9 | 54 | E52 | Monetary Policy |
| 10 | 54 | J31 | Wage Level and Structure - Wage Differentials |
| 11 | 50 | E21 | Consumption - Saving - Wealth |
| 12 | 49 | E44 | Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy |
| 13 | 45 | D81 | Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty |
| 14 | 45 | G21 | Banks - Depository Institutions - Micro Finance Institutions - Mortgages |
| 15 | 42 | C91 | Laboratory, Individual Behavior |
| 16 | 42 | D86 | Economics of Contract: Theory |
| 17 | 39 | C72 | Noncooperative Games |
| 18 | 38 | C78 | Bargaining Theory - Matching Theory |
| 19 | 38 | D03 | Distribution |
| 20 | 37 | C73 | Stochastic and Dynamic Games - Evolutionary Games - Repeated Games |

Notes: Column 1 shows the rank in terms of frequency, from highest to lowest. Column 2 shows the frequency. Column 3 lists the JEL code and column 4 lists the actual labels of the JEL codes.

Table A20: 20 Most Frequent JEL Codes of Papers Edited by Female Editors

| Rank | Frequency | JEL code | Description |
|------|-----------|----------|--|
| 1 | 37 | J24 | Human Capital - Skills - Occupational Choice - Labor Productivity |
| 2 | 30 | O15 | Human Resources - Human Development - Income Distribution - Migration |
| 3 | 29 | J31 | Wage Level and Structure - Wage Differentials |
| 4 | 27 | D72 | Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| 5 | 25 | E32 | Business Fluctuations - Cycles |
| 6 | 24 | J16 | Economics of Gender - Non-labor Discrimination |
| 7 | 23 | D83 | Search - Learning - Information and Knowledge - Communication - Belief - Unawareness |
| 8 | 23 | J13 | Fertility - Family Planning - Child Care - Children - Youth |
| 9 | 19 | O17 | Formal and Informal Sectors - Shadow Economy - Institutional Arrangements |
| 10 | 18 | J15 | Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants - Non-labor Discrimination |
| 11 | 17 | D22 | Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis |
| 12 | 17 | E21 | Consumption - Saving - Wealth |
| 13 | 17 | I21 | Analysis of Education |
| 14 | 16 | E52 | Monetary Policy |
| 15 | 16 | I18 | Government Policy - Regulation - Public Health |
| 16 | 16 | R23 | Regional Migration - Regional Labor Markets - Population - Neighborhood Characteristics |
| 17 | 15 | J22 | Time Allocation and Labor Supply |
| 18 | 15 | K42 | Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law |
| 19 | 14 | E24 | Employment - Unemployment - Wages - Intergenerational Income Distribution - Aggregate Human Capital - Aggregate Labor Productivity |
| 20 | 14 | E44 | Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy |

Notes: Column 1 shows the rank in terms of frequency, from highest to lowest. Column 2 shows the frequency. Column 3 lists the JEL code and column 4 lists the actual labels of the JEL codes.

Table A21: 20 Most Frequent Topics

| Topic rank | Count | Representative Keywords |
|------------|-------|--|
| 1 | 1788 | tax, taxation, taxes, income, optimal |
| 2 | 1090 | education, school, college, schooling, schools |
| 3 | 1143 | price, monopoly, monopolistic, pricing, competition |
| 4 | 1256 | estimators, simultaneous, estimation, moment, least |
| 5 | 849 | games, repeated, nash, equilibria, game |
| 6 | 657 | insurance, health, care, hospital, medical |
| 7 | 813 | trade, tariff, tariffs, international, intermediate |
| 8 | 501 | auctions, auction, bidding, firstprice, bidders |
| 9 | 953 | equilibria, equilibrium, existence, economies, stability |
| 10 | 472 | migration, immigration, immigrants, remittances, immigrant |
| 11 | 479 | retirement, pension, security, social, pensions |
| 12 | 499 | voting, elections, media, voter, electoral |
| 13 | 614 | interest, rates, term, rate, structure |
| 14 | 402 | housing, rent, house, rentseeking, seeking |
| 15 | 611 | public, goods, provision, good, local |
| 16 | 563 | contracts, incentive, contracting, renegotiation, contract |
| 17 | 744 | growth, balanced, twosector, economic, endogenous |
| 18 | 552 | unemployment, duration, insurance, involuntary, benefits |
| 19 | 507 | fiscal, budget, deficits, government, spending |
| 20 | 460 | inflation, inflationary, targeting, price, expectations |

Notes: Representative topic words are extracted using class-based TF-IDF (c-TF-IDF).

Table A22: Productivity: Number of Papers published during Editorial Service

| | All | Top-8 | Top-field | Editors | Associate Editors |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| 4 yrs before | -0.052 (0.053) | -0.018 (0.067) | -0.097 (0.083) | -0.115* (0.064) | -0.031 (0.077) |
| 3 yrs before | -0.012 (0.044) | 0.030 (0.056) | -0.045 (0.067) | -0.066 (0.054) | 0.027 (0.061) |
| 2 yrs before | -0.016 (0.038) | 0.017 (0.049) | -0.017 (0.054) | -0.080 (0.051) | 0.029 (0.049) |
| Year of appointment | -0.031 (0.036) | -0.016 (0.046) | -0.039 (0.052) | -0.110** (0.049) | 0.032 (0.046) |
| 1 yr after | -0.090** (0.043) | -0.112** (0.053) | -0.008 (0.064) | -0.098* (0.053) | -0.036 (0.057) |
| 2 yr after | -0.168*** (0.050) | -0.184*** (0.063) | -0.057 (0.082) | -0.110* (0.060) | -0.124* (0.069) |
| 3 yrs after | -0.125** (0.062) | -0.181** (0.077) | -0.023 (0.103) | -0.144** (0.070) | -0.078 (0.090) |
| 4 yrs after | -0.162** (0.076) | -0.128 (0.092) | -0.087 (0.127) | -0.145* (0.083) | -0.037 (0.111) |
| 5 yrs after | -0.157* (0.089) | -0.209* (0.106) | -0.049 (0.152) | -0.134 (0.095) | -0.045 (0.134) |
| 4 yrs before × Female=1 | 0.065 (0.101) | 0.181 (0.117) | 0.089 (0.150) | 0.301** (0.142) | 0.013 (0.118) |
| 3 yrs before × Female=1 | 0.068 (0.091) | 0.026 (0.107) | 0.118 (0.146) | 0.104 (0.167) | -0.067 (0.097) |
| 2 yrs before × Female=1 | 0.002 (0.098) | 0.051 (0.112) | -0.016 (0.167) | 0.313* (0.183) | -0.082 (0.108) |
| Year of appointment × Female=1 | -0.001 (0.094) | 0.123 (0.113) | -0.108 (0.134) | 0.135 (0.151) | 0.018 (0.109) |
| 1 yr after × Female=1 | 0.165 (0.107) | 0.116 (0.107) | 0.175 (0.186) | 0.257 (0.192) | 0.054 (0.114) |
| 2 yr after × Female=1 | 0.065 (0.089) | 0.164 (0.104) | -0.035 (0.141) | 0.213 (0.148) | 0.058 (0.101) |
| 3 yrs after × Female=1 | -0.088 (0.090) | -0.121 (0.111) | 0.177 (0.143) | 0.335** (0.162) | -0.142 (0.103) |
| 4 yrs after × Female=1 | 0.102 (0.114) | 0.132 (0.134) | -0.019 (0.171) | 0.208 (0.179) | 0.060 (0.131) |
| 5 yrs after × Female=1 | -0.072 (0.103) | -0.114 (0.128) | 0.043 (0.170) | 0.277 (0.207) | -0.139 (0.121) |
| Number of observations | 15991 | 10566 | 8780 | 8728 | 11239 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.22 |
| Author FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Age FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of publications per year. The sample consists of all active scholars who have held an editorial position in any of the 15 journals (a), top-8 (b) or top-field journals (c), or an editor or associate editor (d) position at any of the 15 journals at least once. Scholars enter the sample up to four years before their editorial service begins and remain in the sample for up to five years or until their service ends. Subsequent editorial appointments are not considered. All specifications control for author, year and academic age fixed effects. Event study dummies are defined relative to the year before the start of service. Standard errors clustered at author-level are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A23: Number of Complaints

| | Top-5/general interest | | Top-field | | Other journals | |
|---------|------------------------|------|-----------|------|----------------|------|
| | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male |
| Minimum | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mean | 1.0 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 1.8 | 2.5 |
| Median | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0.3 | 1 |
| Maximum | 2 | 15 | 15 | 20 | 15 | 20 |
| n | 6 | 51 | 30 | 130 | 48 | 222 |

Notes: The table shows the share of decisions (in percent) the editor reported to come back as complaints.

B Collection of Affiliation Data

We used the open access knowledge graph OpenAlex to gather information on authors' affiliations and extend our publication records by additional journals. In contrast to many other bibliographic databases, such as Web of Science or Scopus, OpenAlex offers a wider set of sources including working paper series, books and research datasets, providing a richer set of information over time. At the same time, OpenAlex is less curated than these services, and misassignments of authors to papers occur more frequently. We therefore took additional steps to clean the raw affiliation data, which we describe in more detail below.

We obtained bibliographic information on all authors in the publication dataset who published at least once in the years 2000 to 2019 in two main steps. First, we searched for each paper and obtained the OpenAlex ID of all authors on the paper. We first attempted to find the paper by its doi ID. If this failed, we searched by title and finally, by title and author. In a second step, we collected the full publication records associated with the set of OpenAlex IDs obtained in the previous step. From each publication, we extracted the affiliations listed on the paper, along with other information we use in the subsequent data cleaning process.

In order to clean the raw affiliation data, we first exclude sources that do not distinguish affiliations by author and sources that report static affiliations only. Specifically, we identify and remove publications by sources with at least 50 papers in our sample, of which at least 80% of publications with three or more authors list the same affiliation for all authors. To make affiliations consistent with the ranking we later apply, we replace institutions that act under a common umbrella (e.g. Universitat Pompeu Fabra) by their umbrella institution (i.e. Barcelona School of Economics).

To detect entries in which several authors were incorrectly logged under the same ID, we applied hierarchical clustering to each publication pair within an author ID. For each paper pair, we interact a measure of distance between the topics of the two papers (based on a topic distance matrix which we constructed from the whole sample based on the frequency of

authors publishing in both topics³⁶) with a variable indicating whether both papers list the same affiliation. This procedure helps to identify papers with high distance from other papers within an author ID, since paper pairs listing different affiliations in fields that rarely co-occur within an author receive a high distance measure. If the maximum distance (difference in ‘height’) between clusters exceeds a given sensitivity threshold, an author’s papers are sorted into clusters. In this case, only papers within clusters that also contain at least one paper from the original paper-level data set are retained, e.g. if author has papers in 3 clusters, but only cluster 1 and 2 contain papers that are in the paper-level data set, we only keep clusters 1 and 2.

If an author was associated with several OpenAlex IDs, we check if the affiliations of that ID intersect with the affiliations of at least one other ID of that author. If true, we assume that this ID belongs to the set of the author’s IDs (i.e. the author has at least 2 author IDs). If an author ID was associated with several authors in our paper-level data set, the author is discarded.

Next, we find the most frequent affiliation for each author in a given year. Since we aim to capture authors’ main long-term affiliation, we discard affiliations that are typically due to fellowship positions (e.g. NBER, CEPR) and give priority to educational affiliations in case an institution hosts both regular and fellowship positions (e.g. Ifo). We try to solve any remaining ties between two institutions by prioritizing consistent affiliation sequences over time. Finally, we bridge one period switches, by removing switches to and back from an affiliation within two periods, as these short-term affiliations are likely visiting positions or mistakes in the raw data. Any authors with remaining ties between institutions are discarded.

Subsequently, we convert the dataset in a panel, filling gaps between two equal affiliations across time and flagging observations for which we cannot date the year when a switch between institutions occurred. For the flagged switches, we use GPT-assisted web searches to

³⁶We use four-digit subfields, see <https://github.com/ourresearch/openalex-topic-classification> for a documentation on the assignment of papers to topics.

identify publicly available sources documenting moves between institutions.³⁷ Eventually, all authors, for which we could not identify the switching date, were discarded.

Finally, we classify institutions based on Repec’s March 2026 ranking of economics departments into the following groups: US top-10, top-11 to top-20 and top-21 to top-50, European top-20 and other (i.e. outside US and Europe) top-20 departments.³⁸ All other departments were grouped into the base category. The list of departments along with their rank are reported in Appendix Tables B1 for US and B2 for institutions outside the US.

In total, we could reconstruct reliable affiliation histories for about 18,000 authors out of the 25,000 authors who published at least once within the last 20 years of our sample. To assess the accuracy of our dataset, we conducted a validation exercise with 100 randomly selected authors, for which we hand-checked whether the rank of affiliation in our dataset was identical to the affiliation specified in their CV: in sum, for 95 authors the affiliation rank was fully correct, in 4 cases the rank was partially correct (i.e. for some years), and in only one case the rank was fully incorrect.

³⁷We used model gpt-5.4-mini, instructing GPT to only extract a move date, if it is supported by a reliable source, and specify not to infer or reconstruct any missing steps. In addition, we ask GPT to include the source url as well as the probability in the response and only retain answers with a probability of at least 90%. In addition, we check if the year of the move falls within the last year of the origin institution and the first year of the destination institution in our dataset.

³⁸For the US ranking see <https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.usecondept.html>

Table B1: Ranking of US Institutions

| Rank | Institution | Location |
|------|---|----------|
| 1 | Harvard University | US |
| 2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | US |
| 3 | University of California, Berkeley | US |
| 4 | University of Chicago | US |
| 5 | Stanford University | US |
| 6 | Yale University | US |
| 7 | Princeton University | US |
| 8 | Columbia University | US |
| 9 | New York University | US |
| 10 | Brown University | US |
| 11 | University of Pennsylvania | US |
| 12 | Boston University | US |
| 13 | Northwestern University | US |
| 14 | University of Michigan | US |
| 15 | University of California, San Diego | US |
| 16 | Dartmouth College | US |
| 17 | University of Southern California | US |
| 18 | University of California, Los Angeles | US |
| 19 | Duke University | US |
| 20 | University of Wisconsin-Madison | US |
| 21 | Cornell University | US |
| 22 | Michigan State University | US |
| 23 | Boston College | US |
| 24 | Johns Hopkins University | US |
| 25 | University of California, Davis | US |
| 26 | University of California, Irvine | US |
| 27 | Vanderbilt University | US |
| 28 | University of Notre Dame | US |
| 29 | University of Texas at Austin | US |
| 30 | University of Maryland, College Park | US |
| 31 | University of Minnesota | US |
| 32 | Georgetown University | US |
| 33 | University of Virginia | US |
| 34 | University of California, Santa Barbara | US |
| 35 | University of Colorado Boulder | US |
| 36 | Rutgers University | US |
| 37 | Pennsylvania State University | US |
| 38 | Cornell University | US |
| 39 | Washington University in St Louis | US |
| 40 | University of California, Santa Cruz | US |
| 41 | George Washington University | US |
| 42 | Arizona State University | US |
| 42 | Ohio State University | US |
| 44 | Purdue University | US |
| 44 | Tufts University | US |
| 46 | University of Washington | US |
| 47 | Williams College | US |
| 48 | Texas A&M University | US |
| 49 | University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign | US |
| 50 | University of Oregon | US |

Table B2: Ranking of non-US Institutions

| Rank | Institution | Location |
|------|---|----------|
| 1 | London School of Economics (LSE) | Europe |
| 2 | Paris School of Economics | Europe |
| 3 | Oxford University | Europe |
| 4 | Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) | Europe |
| 5 | Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi | Europe |
| 6 | Barcelona School of Economics (BSE) | Europe |
| 7 | University College London (UCL) | Europe |
| 8 | Universität Zürich | Europe |
| 9 | Sciences Po | Europe |
| 10 | Universiteit van Tilburg | Europe |
| 11 | University of Warwick | Europe |
| 12 | London Business School (LBS) | Europe |
| 13 | Stockholm School of Economics | Europe |
| 14 | KU Leuven | Europe |
| 15 | Rijksuniversiteit Groningen | Europe |
| 16 | Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) | Europe |
| 17 | Université Libre de Bruxelles | Europe |
| 18 | University of Nottingham | Europe |
| 19 | University of Cambridge | Europe |
| 20 | Aarhus Universitet | Europe |
| 1 | Monash University | Outside |
| 2 | University of British Columbia | Outside |
| 3 | University of Toronto | Outside |
| 4 | UNSW Sydney | Outside |
| 5 | University of Western Ontario | Outside |
| 6 | Tel Aviv University | Outside |
| 7 | Queen's University | Outside |
| 8 | Australian National University | Outside |
| 9 | University of Melbourne | Outside |
| 10 | University of Queensland | Outside |
| 11 | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Outside |
| 12 | McGill University | Outside |
| 13 | University of Sydney | Outside |
| 14 | Universidad de Chile | Outside |
| 15 | University of Hong Kong | Outside |
| 16 | Deakin University | Outside |
| 17 | University of Tokyo | Outside |
| 18 | New York University Abu Dhabi | Outside |
| 19 | University of Technology Sydney | Outside |
| 20 | Shanghai Jiao Tong University | Outside |

C Survey Questions

This survey is carried out with the objective of measuring expectations about and experiences with editorial roles in journals. We distinguish between two types of roles (which describe well the structure of most top journals, although not all of them):

1. Editors / Co-editors: they are the main decision makers, i.e. they choose referees and write decision letters
2. Associate editors: their main task is providing referee reports

When answering the questions on your past experience, please think of the last 20 years. Before starting the questions on the editorial roles, please fill out 4 demographic questions. All answers remain anonymous. The survey should take at most 15 minutes. Please do not share this link with others.

Please indicate below that you have read and consent to the terms and conditions of this survey.

- I consent
- I do not consent

— *Start of the survey* —

Demographic questions

a. When did you complete your PhD?

- Before the 1980s
- In the 1980s
- In the 1990s
- In the 2000s
- In the 2010s or later

b. Gender

- Male
- Female
- Other/prefer not to say

c. Where are you based in?

- US
- Europe
- Other

d. Which broad field do you work in?

- Applied-Empirical Micro
- Macro-Finance
- Econometrics-Theory
- Other

Main questionnaire

1. Have you ever been offered an editorial position in the last 20 years? Please select “Yes” or “No” in each of the boxes below.

| | Top-5 or top general interest journal | | Top-field journal | | Other journal | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|----|-------------------|----|---------------|----|
| | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Editor / Co-editor | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Associate editor | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

In the following we first focus on experiences and motivations related to the positions you have been offered.

2. Did you say “Yes” or “No” to the offer(s), or “Yes” to some and “No” to others?

| | Yes | No | Yes to some/ No to others |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor at top-field journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at other journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor at other journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

3. For those offers you accepted, what was your main motivation to accept?

[Respondent asked to select “Very important”, “Important” or “Not important” for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- Prestige associated with the job title
- Duty: Serving the profession
- Impact in the profession: Shaping the field
- Financial (please leave blank if the position is unpaid)
- To improve conditions at home institution (e.g. teaching buyouts, decrease admin work etc.)
- Other important motive: if any please specify

4. For those offers you rejected, what was your main motivation to reject?

[Respondent asked to select “Very important”, “Important” or “Not important” for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- It involves too much work
- Don’t feel competent enough/too much responsibility
- Fear of complaints from submitting authors

- Journal/role not prestigious enough
- Already have enough editorial positions
- Other important motive: if any please specify

5. While in the editorial role(s) you indicated before: what were the difficulties you encountered?

[Respondent asked to select “Very important”, “Important” or “Not important” for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- Too much work
- Don’t feel competent enough/too much responsibility
- Difficulty in agreeing/communicating with other members in editorial roles
- Complaints from submitting authors
- Difficulty with the administration/technical staff of the journal
- Difficulty in recruiting referees
- Other important difficulty: if any please specify

6. How many hours per week did you spend on editorial work? Please specify an estimate of the number of hours per week for each position.

| Position | Hours per week |
|---|--------------------------|
| Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Associate editor at top-field journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at other journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Associate editor at other journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |

7. Out of all the decisions you made, what is the percentage that came back in the form of complaints?

| Position | # Complaints |
|---|--------------------------|
| Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at other journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Next we focus on expectations related to positions that you have not been offered.

8. If you were offered, would you be inclined to say “Yes” or “No” to the offer(s)?

| | Yes | No |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor at top-field journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at other journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor at other journal | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

9. If you were offered, what would be your main motivation to accept the offer(s)?

[Respondent asked to select “Very important”, “Important” or “Not important” for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- Prestige associated with the job title
- Duty: Serving the profession
- Impact in the profession: Shaping the field
- Financial (please leave blank if the position is unpaid)
- To improve conditions at home institution (e.g. teaching buyouts, decrease admin work etc.)
- Other important motive: if any please specify

10. If you were offered, what would be your main motivation to reject the offer(s)?

[Respondent asked to select “Very important”, “Important” or “Not important” for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- It involves too much work
- Don't feel competent enough/too much responsibility
- Fear of complaints from submitting authors
- Journal/role not prestigious enough
- Already have enough editorial positions
- Other important motive: if any please specify

11. Now we focus on positions you have not been offered or have been offered but rejected. How many hours per week do you think you would spend on editorial work? Please specify an estimate of the number of hours per week for each position.

| Position | Hours per week |
|---|--------------------------|
| Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Associate editor at top-field journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at other journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Associate editor at other journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |

12. Again, we focus on positions you have not been offered or have been offered but rejected. Out of all decisions you would need to make, what percentage would you expect to come back in the form of complaints?

| Position | # Complaints |
|---|--------------------------|
| Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editor / Co-editor at other journal | <input type="checkbox"/> |

13. Did or does your institution consider any of the following positions for a teaching reduction and/or for a reduction in admin tasks?

| | Top-5 or top general interest journal | | Top field journal | | Other journal | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Editor / Co-editor | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Associate editor | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

14. How many hours per week do you spend on each of the following tasks?

| Task | Hours per week |
|---|--------------------------|
| Teaching | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Student supervision (undergrad, grad, post doc etc) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Administration | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Own research | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Editorial duties | <input type="checkbox"/> |

15. We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.

Do you wish to participate in the lottery?

- Yes
- No